Iran’s Strategic Stalling Begins to Erode American Deterrence

Follow-up & Analysis | B | B

The American–Israeli war with Iran no longer appears to be approaching its final shore.
Instead, it seems to have entered a phase of “uneasy calm” preceding a larger decision.

The latest statements by U.S. President Donald Trump, including his warning on “Truth Social” about “the calm before the storm,” alongside Israeli reports of intensive preparations coordinated with Washington for a possible resumption of war, indicate that the option of renewed escalation remains strongly present on the table.

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Israeli estimates suggest that the probability of Trump returning to the military option stands at around 50% — a figure that reveals the scale of hesitation inside Washington more than it reflects the existence of a decisive decision.

In the background, Trump’s visit to China does not appear to have achieved the breakthrough the U.S. administration had hoped for regarding the Iranian file, despite Chinese President Xi Jinping expressing support for the diplomatic track and calling for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the stabilization of maritime navigation.

In practical terms, however, no real signs of Iranian concessions have emerged so far, nor any clear breakthrough in the Islamabad negotiations held behind the scenes through Pakistani mediation.

At the same time, Tehran is trying to reinforce a different narrative:

We did not start the crisis,
the problem is linked to the “attacks of the aggressors,”
but we are not closing the door to diplomacy.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated in his message to Pope Leo XIV that navigation in the Strait of Hormuz would return to normal once the current “state of insecurity” ends, while reaffirming Iran’s commitment to international law and peaceful solutions.

Yet perhaps the most important message was not merely political —
but maritime and economic.

Iranian state television revealed that European countries have already begun negotiations with the Revolutionary Guard Navy to secure permission for their ships to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, following the passage of Chinese, Japanese, and Pakistani vessels.

The current scene reveals a complex strategic paradox:

Iran says it remains committed to diplomacy,
yet in practice it is managing the Strait of Hormuz according to a logic of “permission to pass.”

And precisely here lies the core of the crisis.

The issue is no longer merely:

Has the Strait been closed or not?

But rather:

Who controls the decision to open it and manage it?

The United States realizes that the continuation of this reality produces a dangerous image:

Iran is gradually transforming from a state under pressure…
into a player imposing the rules of passage, energy, and negotiation.

This is why Washington’s patience appears to be wearing thin.

Not because Iran has achieved a military victory,
but because Iranian “strategic stalling” has begun to erode the prestige of American deterrence, turning the crisis into a prolonged test of wills.

At the same time, however, the United States does not appear to be in a position that allows for a rapid and guaranteed resolution.

Opening the Strait of Hormuz by force is not merely a naval operation,
but a gamble that could ignite:

global energy markets,
maritime routes,
the world economy,
and push the region toward a wider war that may prove difficult to contain.

Thus Washington appears trapped between two costly options:

A new strike…
or accepting a long political and psychological war of attrition.

Deep down, the real question may no longer be:

Will the war return?

But rather:

Which side will exhaust itself first in the game of time, messages, and mutual pressure?