Trump submits the nuclear cooperation agreement for legislative review 18 years after the first understanding, bringing the Kingdom closer to opening competition for its first reactors

Riyadh | BETH

The civil nuclear cooperation agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United States entered the American legislative review stage after President Donald Trump submitted it to Congress on Monday, August 24, 2026, initiating a 90-day congressional review period that will ultimately determine whether American companies can enter the competition to build Saudi Arabia’s first nuclear reactors.

The agreement’s submission to Congress represents the most important procedural step since it was signed last July. It moves Saudi–U.S. nuclear cooperation from the stage of governmental negotiations and understandings to an assessment of its compliance with the requirements of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act.

Under the procedures governing nuclear cooperation agreements, Congress reviews the document, the accompanying nuclear proliferation assessment, and the related safeguards before the agreement can enter into force. It will become effective if the review period expires without the House of Representatives and the Senate adopting a joint resolution of disapproval.

The submission does not mean that an American company has been selected to build the Saudi reactors or that implementation will begin immediately. Rather, it completes the legal framework that allows American companies to compete and subsequently obtain the licenses required to transfer nuclear reactors, components, materials, and expertise to the Kingdom.

The 123 Agreement

Saudi Minister of Energy Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman and U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright signed the Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, known as the “123 Agreement,” on July 22, 2026, alongside an accompanying bilateral safeguards agreement.

The agreement takes its name from Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which requires an approved legal framework before significant nuclear materials, equipment, and components may be transferred from the United States to another country.

The agreement is not a contract to build a specific nuclear plant. Rather, it is a legal umbrella under which subsequent commercial, technical, and training contracts may be concluded, including those covering reactor construction, equipment and fuel supplies, workforce development, the exchange of expertise, and the strengthening of nuclear safety and security standards.

The agreement will remain in force for 30 years from the date it enters into effect, rather than from the date it was signed or submitted to Congress, and may be extended, renewed, or amended by mutual agreement between the two countries.

Contracts for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the reactors and the supply of nuclear fuel will be concluded separately at a later stage, with each contract having its own term, obligations, and conditions.

At the time of signing, the U.S. Department of Energy said the two agreements would establish a multibillion-dollar partnership spanning decades and provide American companies with broad access to Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy program.

A Process That Began in 2008

The formal path toward cooperation began in May 2008, when Riyadh and Washington signed a memorandum of understanding on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The process subsequently moved toward discussions on preparing a comprehensive agreement under Section 123, as the Kingdom developed plans to diversify its sources of electricity generation and establish a peaceful nuclear energy sector.

In 2017, Saudi Arabia began the process of seeking preliminary bids for the construction of its first two nuclear power reactors. The following year, the Kingdom received a mission from the International Atomic Energy Agency to review the infrastructure required for the program.

Over the ensuing years, Saudi Arabia gradually developed the program’s institutional and regulatory framework, trained national talent, and advanced studies concerning sites, technologies, financing, and safety before proceeding with reactor procurement and the construction of facilities that require decades of operational commitment.

In November 2024, the Duwayhin Nuclear Energy Company, designated as the owner and operator of Saudi Arabia’s first nuclear power plant, asked the International Atomic Energy Agency to review its management system and institutional readiness.

The IAEA review, completed in June 2025, concluded that the company had developed a management system capable of supporting its present and future activities. This indicated that the program was gradually moving from general studies toward institutional readiness for its first project.

Why Nuclear Energy?

Saudi Arabia’s entry into nuclear energy is not driven by a shortage of energy resources, but by the need to redistribute those resources and maximize their value.

Generating electricity through nuclear reactors would allow the Kingdom to reduce the use of oil and gas in power stations and direct larger quantities toward exports or higher-value downstream industries.

Nuclear plants also provide stable electricity around the clock, complementing solar and wind power, whose output varies according to the time of day and weather conditions.

Over the long term, nuclear energy could serve water desalination, hydrogen production, energy-intensive industries, data centers, new cities, and major projects as domestic electricity demand continues to rise.

The program is not limited to power generation. It would also create a new chain of industries and services encompassing nuclear engineering, specialized construction, control systems, cybersecurity, fuel and waste management, training, and scientific research.

Inside Congress

Congress’s review will focus on the legal and technical framework governing cooperation, rather than on the Kingdom’s need for nuclear energy or its right to establish a peaceful program.

The review is expected to address guarantees that transferred materials and technologies will be used for peaceful purposes, nuclear material accounting and oversight mechanisms, physical protection and nuclear security standards, and arrangements for transferring equipment, fuel, and technology.

It is also expected to examine the relationship between the agreement and the safeguards applied in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, its effect on U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, and the competitiveness of American companies in the Saudi market.

Three Possible Outcomes

The review process could produce three principal outcomes.

The first, and most likely, is that the review period expires without the adoption of a joint resolution rejecting the agreement. It would then enter into force, after which the licensing, bidding, and contracting stages could begin.

The second is that members of Congress use the review to request additional explanations or safeguards from the U.S. administration. The effects of those requests could subsequently appear in export licenses or implementation arrangements without preventing the agreement from taking effect.

The third possibility is that the House of Representatives and the Senate move to adopt a joint resolution rejecting the agreement. This would require broad political agreement and could then require Congress to override a possible presidential veto, making it more difficult to defeat the agreement than to object to some of its provisions.

Given the nature of the legal process and the American interests associated with the project, the agreement is more likely to pass than to be rejected, although extensive debate over safeguards and implementation mechanisms remains likely.

The Reactor Race

The importance of the agreement extends beyond relations between Riyadh and Washington. Saudi Arabia represents one of the most prominent emerging nuclear energy markets being contested by countries that possess nuclear technology.

The United States needs the agreement for its companies to compete effectively, because without the legal framework, American reactors and nuclear components cannot be transferred to the Kingdom, regardless of how attractive the commercial offers may be.

Westinghouse stands out as a potential American beneficiary through its AP1000 reactors, but the agreement does not automatically award the project to the company or commit the Kingdom to selecting American technology.

During its various stages, the Saudi project has attracted interest from companies in South Korea, China, Russia, and France. This gives the Kingdom room to compare technology, cost, financing, local-content levels, knowledge transfer, fuel guarantees, and long-term maintenance.

The agreement should therefore not be seen as making Saudi Arabia dependent on a single option. Rather, it removes a legal obstacle that had prevented the American option from entering the competition on equal terms.

After the Review

If the agreement clears congressional review, construction of the nuclear plant will not begin the following day. Several technical, commercial, and regulatory stages will remain, including selecting the supplier, approving the technology and site, arranging financing, completing the licensing process, and concluding contracts for construction, operation, fuel, and maintenance.

Building a nuclear power plant is not a short-term undertaking. The International Atomic Energy Agency estimates that establishing a new nuclear power program generally requires a preparatory period of between 10 and 15 years and commits a state to nearly a century of planning and management, from preparation, construction, and operation to reactor decommissioning and spent-fuel management.

The value of the 123 Agreement is therefore not measured solely by the date electricity generation begins, but by its ability to bring American industry, technology, and capital into the Saudi program and establish a long-term relationship encompassing the nuclear project’s entire life cycle and its associated knowledge, services, maintenance, and training.

A Test of Interests

Congress has the right to review the agreement, but the outcome of that review does not concern Saudi Arabia alone.

Rejecting the agreement or imposing restrictions that obstruct its implementation would not necessarily stop the Saudi nuclear program. Instead, it could reduce the presence of American companies and create greater room for competing suppliers.

Allowing the agreement to proceed would give Washington a presence in a vital sector connected to energy, industry, technology, and economic security, while keeping American companies in contention for contracts whose value and impact will extend over decades.

Riyadh recognizes that building the nuclear program requires a reliable technology partner. It also recognizes that international suppliers need access to the Saudi market and the contracts, investments, and long-term partnerships it offers.

The Kingdom therefore enters this new stage as a buyer with alternatives, rather than as a party awaiting the approval of a single supplier.

The Saudi Decision

On the surface, the Saudi nuclear agreement is now before Congress. What the legislative review will determine, however, is the extent of U.S. participation in the program, not the Kingdom’s right to build it.

Saudi Arabia’s path toward nuclear energy began years before this agreement and has advanced through institution-building, regulatory development, workforce training, and expanded cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

If the agreement clears the review, American companies will become eligible to enter the competition through a complete legal framework. If it encounters obstacles, the Kingdom will retain other international options for achieving its objective.

Congress will not decide the future of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program; it will decide the place of the United States within it.