Trump announces that the strait’s international waters have been cleared and threatens to destroy any vessel that attempts to lay new mines, as Washington begins returning its diplomats to the region—while shipping remains far below normal levels

August 25, 2026

Follow-up and Analysis | Strategic Media Department – BETH Agency

U.S. President Donald Trump announced that all mines in the international waters of the Strait of Hormuz had either been removed or detonated, warning Iran that any ship or boat attempting to lay new mines would be destroyed.

He said the United States was monitoring “every inch” of the strait and that a zero-tolerance policy toward mine-laying was now fully in effect.

Two U.S. officials confirmed that the main shipping lane used by vessels transiting the strait had been completely cleared following an operation conducted by U.S. forces over recent months.

The Strait Is Not Yet Open

The announcement represents a significant operational development: Washington has removed one of the most dangerous physical threats to navigation, but it has not announced the restoration of normal shipping traffic.

Clearing the mines does not eliminate Iran’s ability to threaten tankers with missiles, drones, and armed boats. Nor does it remove the restrictions, vessel blacklists, and fines Tehran has attempted to impose.

Oil exports passing through the strait remain at approximately five million barrels per day, compared with more than twenty million barrels before the war.

The passage has therefore become less dangerous beneath the surface, but it is still not entirely safe above it.

Diplomats Return

At the same time, the United States has begun returning personnel to its diplomatic missions in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Israel, and Iraq after reducing staffing levels as the war escalated.

Family members of employees at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh have also been permitted to return, while other missions in Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar are preparing to increase their operational capacity.

The move does not mean the danger has ended, but it indicates that the current U.S. security assessment no longer anticipates an immediate, large-scale military confrontation of the magnitude that prompted evacuations and staffing reductions.

Oil Markets Price In De-escalation

Oil markets interpreted the developments as a reduction in the risk of escalation. Prices fell by more than 4%, with Brent crude declining to approximately $88.34 per barrel and West Texas Intermediate to $81.67.

Markets did not regard the new U.S. sanctions as a fully implemented blockade because Washington did not target major Chinese banks and has yet to identify the countries that could face exclusion from the dollar-based financial system or specify when such measures would take effect.

The Blockade Reaches Fuel Supplies

Meanwhile, the effects of economic pressure have become increasingly visible inside Iran, where queues have formed outside fuel stations in Tehran and other cities amid gasoline shortages.

Estimates indicate a shortfall of approximately 15 million liters per day, while inflation is approaching 90% and the Iranian currency has fallen to roughly two million rials to the U.S. dollar.

The fuel shortage leaves the Iranian government facing a difficult choice: reduce subsidies and raise prices, potentially provoking domestic anger, or continue financing a system that has become increasingly costly under the blockade and sanctions.

Who Controls Hormuz?

The central question remains: What does the United States stand to gain from a military and economic operation of this magnitude?

The American objective extends beyond clearing mines and restoring navigation. It involves wresting the Strait of Hormuz from Iran’s control as an instrument of pressure and turning its security into a direct U.S. responsibility.

In doing so, Washington seeks to restore its ability to protect energy flows, reassure its allies, rebuild deterrence, and pressure Tehran into negotiating from a weaker position—while forcing Iran’s trading partners to choose between dealing with Tehran and retaining access to the dollar-based financial system.

This provides the context for President Donald Trump’s statement that he considers the Strait of Hormuz “American territory.”

The statement does not confer legal sovereignty over the strait on the United States. Instead, it expresses a different concept of control: that Washington should be the power protecting the waterway, determining the conditions of passage through it, and preventing Iran from using it whenever it chooses.

But this raises a more sensitive question: Is the entire confrontation a coordinated performance involving the United States, Iran, and Israel?

The history of relations among the three parties shows that public hostility has not prevented secret contacts and transactions when their interests converged. Trita Parsi documented this in his book Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States. The Iran-Contra affair provided further confirmation when U.S. weapons reached Iran through Israel at the height of their publicly declared hostility.

Historical precedent, however, is not enough to prove the existence of a coordinated performance today.

The more likely explanation is that this is a genuine confrontation governed by undeclared limits. The United States and Israel strike to weaken Iran without bringing down the state. Tehran responds in ways intended to preserve the regime’s image without provoking a blow that could endanger its survival. Meanwhile, channels through intermediaries remain open to prevent the war from exceeding the limits all sides can bear.

This does not mean the parties have agreed upon a single script. Rather, each is attempting to write an ending that serves its own interests.

The United States wants to regain control over Hormuz. Israel wants to weaken Iran’s capabilities. The Iranian regime wants to survive and transform its endurance into a political victory.

The war, therefore, may not be a coordinated performance—but neither is it a confrontation without restraints. It is a genuine war interwoven with messages, communications, and precise calculations, in which every party knows where to apply pressure, when to stop, and what it wants to preserve for the negotiating table.

Conclusion

The mines have been removed from the main shipping lane, but the struggle over who controls the decision-making power in Hormuz is not over.

Iran has lost part of its ability to disrupt the strait, while the United States is attempting to convert its military achievement into long-term political and security control. Between them, mediation efforts continue in search of an agreement that would prevent mines, warships, and sanctions from returning to the forefront.

One question remains:

Did the United States clear the mines from Hormuz to end the war—or to seize control of its course and determine when it ends?