Existing Alternatives and Possible Projects.. Can the World Turn the Strait from an Indispensable Artery into a Maritime Passage That Can Be Bypassed?

Preparation and Analysis | Strategic Media Department – BETH Agency
Supervision: Abdullah Al-Omairah

Riyadh | BETH

The search for alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz is no longer a theoretical exercise prepared by research centers for potential wars; following the disruption of navigation and the halt of a large part of the flows, it has turned into an urgent economic and security question:

Can the world dispense with Hormuz?

The direct answer: Not now.

The more important strategic answer is: Dependence on it can be significantly reduced if the countries of the region move from establishing individual lines to building an integrated network of pipelines, ports, storage facilities, railways, and alternative export routes.

The world does not need another strait to replace Hormuz, but rather a group of routes that prevent one state or one crisis from holding global energy and trade inside a single maritime passage.

Why Is It Difficult to Replace?

Nearly 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products passed through the Strait of Hormuz during 2025, representing about one-quarter of global seaborne oil trade, in addition to more than 110 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas.

Around 80% of the oil passing through the strait goes to Asia, while most of Qatar’s and the UAE’s liquefied natural gas exports depend on it almost entirely.

In contrast, the International Energy Agency estimates the currently available capacity of pipelines capable of bypassing Hormuz at only between 3.5 million and 5.5 million barrels per day.

This means that the existing alternatives, even when used at full capacity, compensate for only part of the usual flows, while most exports from Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Iran remain tied to the strait.

But this gap does not mean that replacement is impossible in the future; rather, it reveals the scale of the projects required and the countries that will become central to the new map.

Saudi Arabia.. the Ready Alternative

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia possesses the most important existing infrastructure for bypassing the Strait of Hormuz: the East–West crude oil pipeline, known as “Petroline,” which transports oil from Abqaiq in the Eastern Province to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, over a distance of approximately 1,200 kilometers.

The system’s basic design capacity is around five million barrels per day, while Aramco announced that it had raised its capacity to around seven million barrels per day after converting part of the natural gas liquids pipelines to carry crude oil.

Before the war, large portions of the pipeline’s capacity were unused. With the disruption in Hormuz, the Kingdom raised its exports from Yanbu from around two million barrels per day to more than five million barrels per day in early June, according to estimates by the International Energy Agency.

This is not a theoretical capability; rather, it is a practical test that proved the Kingdom can redirect a large portion of its exports from the Gulf to the Red Sea within a short period.

What Does the Saudi Route Need?

Increasing the pipeline’s capacity alone is not enough, because every barrel arriving at the western coast requires:

• Additional receiving and storage tanks.
• Loading berths and tankers in Yanbu.
• Expanded pumping and processing capacity.
• Protection for the pipeline extending across the Kingdom.
• Greater integration with refineries and industrial complexes on the Red Sea.
• A fleet and insurance network capable of accommodating the increase in exports.

This means that the real project is not “expanding a pipeline,” but transforming the western coast into a parallel global center for exporting, storing, refining, and trading oil.

The Saudi Advantage

The Kingdom possesses what is unavailable to most Gulf producers: enormous fields in the east, coastlines on both the Gulf and the Red Sea, a contiguous geographical area, and full sovereignty over the pipeline route from the production point to the export port.

This makes it, among the major Gulf producers, the country most capable of building a broad land energy bridge between the Gulf and the Red Sea without passing through the territory of another state.

Its location also gives it the possibility of transforming from a transporter of its own oil alone into a regional hub that receives part of the oil of neighboring countries and then transports it through an expanded Saudi network to Yanbu or other ports on the western coast.

But this requires cross-border interconnection agreements, commercial and regulatory frameworks, long-term guarantees, and additional capacities that exceed Saudi Arabia’s direct needs.

Does the Red Sea Solve the Problem?

Not entirely.

Redirecting exports to Yanbu bypasses Hormuz, but it does not eliminate other maritime risks.

Exports heading north toward Europe can reach the Suez Canal without passing through Bab al-Mandab, which gives Yanbu significant strategic value.

Exports heading to Asia, however, may need to pass south through Bab al-Mandab, moving from a chokepoint in Hormuz to another chokepoint at the entrance to the Red Sea.

Therefore, the East–West pipeline does not represent a complete alternative for all markets; but it gives the Kingdom the freedom to distribute its exports, prevents them from being trapped inside the Gulf, and enhances its ability to direct larger volumes toward Europe and the Mediterranean.

The intelligent alternative does not eliminate all risks; rather, it distributes them so that no single passage can disrupt all exports.

The UAE.. the Fujairah Gateway

The UAE possesses the Habshan–Fujairah pipeline, which extends approximately 380 kilometers from Abu Dhabi’s onshore fields to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz.

The pipeline can transport around 1.8 million barrels per day, while the volumes usually used amount to approximately 1.1 million barrels, leaving an additional capacity estimated at around 700,000 barrels per day.

This route is supported by an underground storage facility near Fujairah with a capacity of around 42 million barrels, giving the UAE flexibility to continue exporting when production or transportation is disrupted.

Abu Dhabi is also constructing a second pipeline with a capacity of approximately 1.5 million barrels per day, targeting operation during 2027, which could raise its capacity to bypass Hormuz to more than three million barrels per day.

The Strength and Limits of the Emirati Route

The port of Fujairah benefits from direct access to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea; therefore, oil heading to Asia does not need to enter Hormuz or the Red Sea.

However, Fujairah is geographically close to the confrontation zone, and its facilities or approach routes could be threatened by missiles, drones, or maritime attacks.

Thus, the pipeline bypasses the strait geographically, but it does not move entirely beyond the surrounding military risk zone.

Oman.. the Alternative Coast

Oman has a long coastline open directly to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, along with the ports of Sohar, Duqm, and Salalah.

Oil or gas reaching Duqm or Salalah does not need to pass through Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab to reach Asia and East Africa.

From here, Oman appears in future scenarios not only as a political mediator in the strait crisis, but also as the geographically safest alternative coast for Gulf exports heading eastward.

The proposed or potentially viable options include:

• Extending oil pipelines from within the Arabian Peninsula to Duqm.
• Connecting Gulf gas networks to new liquefaction facilities on the Omani coast.
• Establishing joint strategic storage facilities and export terminals.
• Developing land corridors and railways to transport containers and goods from the Gulf to the Arabian Sea.
• Connecting Omani ports to production and distribution centers in the Kingdom and the UAE.

But these projects require investments worth billions of dollars, long routes, regional agreements, pumping stations, and new export and liquefaction capacities.

The Saudi–Omani Route

Geographically and strategically, connecting the Kingdom’s networks to the port of Duqm or another Omani port represents a long-term option worthy of study.

It could give Saudi oil and products direct access to the Arabian Sea without Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab, while also forming a regional corridor for the exports of other countries.

But its feasibility depends on comparing its cost with the expansion of existing Saudi routes toward Yanbu and on the targeted markets; exports to Europe favor the Red Sea, while the Omani coast provides a shorter route to Asia.

Therefore, the correct option may not be choosing between Yanbu and Duqm, but building a dual network:

• A western route serving Europe and the Mediterranean.
• A southeastern route serving Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Iraq.. Three Potential Gateways

Iraq depends heavily on the ports of Basra and the Gulf, but its location theoretically gives it three alternatives.

Basra–Aqaba

The project involves transporting oil from Basra to the Jordanian port of Aqaba on the Red Sea, with a proposed capacity of up to one million barrels per day.

The project was proposed decades ago and received preliminary approvals, but it stalled because of cost, security risks, political disagreements, and financing difficulties.

If completed, it would give Iraq an outlet independent of Hormuz and strengthen Jordan’s position as an energy and transportation hub, but it would require the protection of a long pipeline passing through security-sensitive areas.

Iraq–Türkiye

Oil pipelines running to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean could play a larger role, but they are primarily linked to northern production and repeatedly face legal, political, technical, and security problems.

Expanding this route and connecting it to larger volumes from southern Iraq would require new infrastructure across the country and is not a solution that can be activated quickly.

Iraq–Oman

Proposals and preliminary studies have been introduced for a corridor that would transport Iraqi oil to the Omani coast, benefiting from Duqm or other Arabian Sea ports.

The project would provide direct access to Asian markets, but it faces complications related to distance, passage through the territory of other countries, high costs, and the need for a long-term regional political agreement.

Kuwait and Bahrain.. Difficult Geography

Kuwait and Bahrain currently possess no operational export pipelines that bypass Hormuz.

They have three future options:

• Connecting to the Kingdom’s pipelines toward the Red Sea.
• Establishing a joint Gulf network reaching Oman or Fujairah.
• Expanding external storage in consumer markets to reduce the impact of temporary disruptions.

The Saudi option appears to be the most geographically realistic for Kuwait and Bahrain, but it requires a significant increase in the capacity of Saudi pipelines and agreements determining priority, pricing, and responsibility for operation and protection.

Without regional interconnection, the two countries will remain among the producers most exposed to any prolonged closure of the strait.

Qatar.. the Most Difficult Dilemma

The most serious gap lies not in oil, but in liquefied natural gas.

Around 93% of Qatar’s liquefied natural gas exports pass through Hormuz, and there are currently no alternative routes capable of transporting these volumes to global markets.

Liquefied natural gas cannot simply be transferred into an oil pipeline; it requires:

• Massive gas pipelines.
• Processing facilities.
• New liquefaction plants outside the Gulf.
• Specialized storage facilities and terminals.
• Contracts, fleets, and export facilities linked to the new location.

The Dolphin network transports Qatari gas to the UAE and Oman, but it has limited capacity, while Omani liquefied natural gas facilities operate near their maximum capacity; therefore, they cannot accommodate Qatar’s current exports.

The Possible Qatari Alternative

One possible long-term strategic solution is to construct a major gas pipeline from Qatar, through the Kingdom or the UAE, to the Omani coast and connect it to new liquefaction plants in Duqm or another location on the Arabian Sea.

Another route could theoretically be extended to the Saudi coast on the Red Sea, but it would be longer, while gas heading to Asia would face a longer maritime journey through Bab al-Mandab.

The Omani route represents a more suitable option for Asian markets, but it requires enormous investments, a lengthy construction period, and complex sovereign and commercial agreements.

Therefore, Qatari gas will remain the last file capable of being freed from Hormuz, even if the region succeeds in finding broad alternatives for oil.

Iran Is Also Building Its Alternative

Iran recognizes the danger of its dependence on Hormuz, and therefore it constructed the Goreh–Jask pipeline and the Jask export terminal on the Gulf of Oman, with an announced capacity of up to one million barrels per day.

But the route has not yet become a reliable operational alternative; the International Energy Agency indicates that the terminal carried out a limited test shipment and did not continue exporting regular commercial volumes.

This reveals an important paradox:

Iran, which uses Hormuz to pressure others, also needs to escape from it.

The more it tightens its control over the strait, the greater the international pressure on its exports and ports inside the Gulf, and the greater its need to develop Jask or other outlets outside the passage.

Non-Oil Trade

The problem is not limited to oil and gas; closing Hormuz disrupts containers, food, fertilizers, metals, spare parts, and production chains.

In this field, railways and land corridors can provide alternatives more quickly than energy pipelines.

The main options include:

• The Gulf railway network.
• The Saudi land bridge between Gulf and Red Sea ports.
• Connecting Saudi ports to logistics centers and industrial zones.
• Transporting containers from Omani and Fujairah ports to Gulf markets by trains and trucks.
• Developing dry ports and strategic commodity warehouses within the countries.

Railways cannot transport tens of millions of barrels of oil, but they can protect high-value trade, reduce the shutdown of factories and markets, and prevent the maritime crisis from turning into a food and industrial crisis.

Storage Outside the Gulf

Not all alternatives are physical routes.

Establishing oil and commercial reserves inside consumer countries gives producers the ability to continue deliveries during the first weeks of a closure, even if shipments from the source stop.

Some Gulf countries already maintain reserves in India, Japan, South Korea, and other locations.

This model can be expanded through:

• Leasing storage tanks in Asian markets.
• Establishing joint reserves between producers and consumers.
• Storing crude oil and refined products outside the region.
• Signing swap agreements that allow cargoes to be delivered from alternative locations.
• Increasing food and industrial reserves within the Gulf.

These measures do not replace Hormuz, but they buy time and limit Iran’s ability to create a broad and immediate economic impact merely by threatening the passage.

Military Protection Is Not an Alternative

International fleets can escort ships, clear mines, pursue boats, and strike missile launchers, but they keep trade inside the strait itself.

The success of military escorts is not measured by the passage of a ship or convoy, but by the return of thousands of commercial voyages and the willingness of insurance companies and sailors to operate normally.

Military force therefore represents a tool for keeping Hormuz open, not an alternative to it.

The distinction is fundamental:

• Securing the strait addresses the threat.
• Building alternative routes addresses dependence on the strait.

Can Pipelines Defeat Geography?

Technically, yes.

It is theoretically possible to build pipelines that transport most Gulf oil to the Red Sea or the Arabian Sea if the investments, agreements, and time are available.

But establishing a network capable of transporting 15 million to 20 million barrels per day requires tens of billions of dollars, new ports, electricity, pumping and storage stations, and protected routes extending for thousands of kilometers.

Replacing the route of liquefied natural gas is more complex and costly because it requires rebuilding part of the liquefaction industry itself outside the Gulf.

Each new route also creates new protection points:

• The pipeline may be sabotaged.
• The pumping station may be targeted.
• The port may be closed.
• The Red Sea faces the risks of Bab al-Mandab.
• Fujairah and Duqm may become strategic targets.
• Cross-border pipelines are affected by political disagreements.

No infrastructure is free of risk; but the multiplicity of routes prevents a single threat from disrupting the entire supply system.

The Water Canal.. the Farthest-Reaching Idea

For years, proposals have been introduced to establish a water canal across Saudi territory connecting the Gulf to the Red Sea, including a proposed canal with a length of approximately 1,300 kilometers, along with another concept connecting the Gulf to the Arabian Sea through the Empty Quarter.

These concepts do not currently represent an approved government project; no official announcement has been issued adopting them or initiating a binding implementation study. Nevertheless, the Hormuz crisis has restored value to the idea as something worthy of study, not as an imminent project, but as a long-term strategic possibility.

From an engineering perspective, the Kingdom is not incapable of implementing a massive project if its feasibility is established; it constructed the East–West pipeline across the Arabian Peninsula and is implementing projects today that exceed in complexity what was considered impossible only years ago.

But a water canal differs from a pipeline; it requires excavating a wide and deep navigational route across more than one thousand kilometers, addressing elevation differences and mountainous formations, and constructing locks, bridges, and permanent operational and protection facilities.

If studies establish its feasibility, the project could give the Kingdom a global passage under its sovereignty, shorten some shipping routes, create ports, cities, and industrial and logistics centers inland, and reduce Hormuz’s monopoly over energy and trade movements.

On the other hand, its cost could be far greater than the estimates being circulated, with risks affecting groundwater and the desert environment, as well as the possibility of leakage, salinization, and evaporation, in addition to the need to protect a long facility that could itself become a target or chokepoint.

Therefore, the idea should neither be rejected as fantasy nor presented as a ready project; rather, it should be subjected to a modern and independent Saudi study comparing the canal with pipeline expansion, railways, and corridors heading toward the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. The question is not: Can the Kingdom implement it? Rather: Would the canal be the best possible use of this capability?

The Map in Summary

The alternatives to Hormuz are divided among routes that are already operating, others under construction, and projects that remain under study.

Existing Routes

The Saudi Abqaiq–Yanbu pipeline leads the currently operating alternatives, with a capacity ranging between five million and seven million barrels per day, and gives the Kingdom a sovereign outlet to the Red Sea. But it needs expanded pumping, storage, and loading facilities, while its exports heading to Asia may encounter another chokepoint at Bab al-Mandab.

The UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah pipeline follows, with a capacity of approximately 1.8 million barrels per day, providing direct access to the Arabian Sea without passing through Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab. However, Fujairah’s proximity to the confrontation zone keeps the pipeline and port within the scope of military risks.

As for Iran’s Goreh–Jask pipeline, its announced capacity is around one million barrels per day, but it has not yet become a regular commercial route, revealing the difference between announced capacity and sustainable operational capability.

Projects Under Construction

The UAE is building a second pipeline to Fujairah with an estimated capacity of around 1.5 million barrels per day, targeting operation during 2027, which could approximately double its capacity to export oil from outside Hormuz.

The Kingdom is studying the expansion of the East–West system, alongside the possibility of linking it to the exports of some Gulf countries, which could transform it from a Saudi route into a regional energy bridge between the Gulf and the Red Sea.

Projects Awaiting a Decision

The Basra–Aqaba pipeline, with a proposed capacity of one million barrels per day, remains stalled by financing, security, and political challenges, despite its ability to give Iraq independent access to the Red Sea.

Connecting Gulf production areas to the Omani coast stands out as one of the most important future options; it would provide direct access to the Arabian Sea and Asian markets, but it requires long pipelines, cross-border agreements, and enormous investments.

Transporting Qatari gas to the Omani coast and connecting it to new liquefaction facilities represents a long-term solution to the most difficult aspect of dependence on Hormuz, but it is more complex and costly than the oil alternatives.

Trade and Storage Alternatives

Railways, the Saudi land bridge, and dry ports can transport containers, food products, and industrial goods between the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Sea, but they cannot compensate for oil and gas exports.

Storage in Asian and European markets also gives producers time to confront disruptions and limits the immediate economic effect of threats to the strait, without constituting an alternative route in itself.

Summary of the Map

The Kingdom and the UAE lead the ready alternatives, while Oman possesses the most geographically attractive location for future projects heading toward Asia.

Iraq possesses potential routes that remain constrained by politics, financing, and security, while Kuwait and Bahrain need to connect to the networks of neighboring countries. Qatari gas remains the most difficult challenge facing any regional plan to bypass Hormuz.

The new map will not be based on a single pipeline replacing the strait, but on a network that gives each country more than one outlet and prevents Hormuz from remaining the sole gateway for energy and trade.

Who Wins?

If the alternatives become a regional policy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will be the greatest strategic beneficiary, not only because it possesses the largest existing pipeline, but because it lies at the center of almost all possible routes:

• Between the Gulf and the Red Sea.
• Between Kuwait, Bahrain, and the western outlets.
• Between Qatar and the potential alternative coast.
• Between Iraq and the Red Sea or the Arabian Peninsula.
• And between Asia, Europe, and Africa.

Oman comes second in terms of future geographical value because its coasts open the Gulf to the Indian Ocean without passing through Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab.

The UAE, meanwhile, possesses the best ready alternative for Asian markets and is working to rapidly double its capacity.

The three countries—the Kingdom, Oman, and the UAE—may become the three sides of an alternative network that redraws the map of energy and trade in the Gulf.

Who Loses?

Iran is the greatest strategic loser from the construction of alternatives, even if it benefits temporarily from threatening the strait.

Hormuz’s political value does not come from its geographical existence, but from the world’s need for it.

Every new pipeline, every port outside the Gulf, every storage facility in Asia, and every railway reaching the Arabian Sea or the Red Sea takes away part of Tehran’s ability to use the strait as leverage.

The relative weight of some ports inside the Gulf may also decline in favor of Yanbu, Fujairah, Duqm, and Salalah as the routes of investment, storage, refining, and insurance change.

The Most Likely Scenario

Hormuz will not disappear, and the world will not stop using it after it reopens, because it will remain the shortest and least costly route for enormous volumes of energy and trade.

But the current crisis will change the way it is treated.

The most likely developments during the coming years are:

1. Permanently increasing the use of the Saudi East–West pipeline and not returning it to its previous low levels.
2. Accelerating the second Emirati pipeline and expanding Fujairah’s facilities.
3. Increasing Saudi and Emirati storage domestically and in Asian markets.
4. Reviving the Basra–Aqaba project and Iraq’s northern routes.
5. Studying corridors to Duqm and the Omani coast more seriously.
6. Proposing a regional network to transport Qatari gas to liquefaction facilities outside Hormuz.
7. Accelerating railways and dry ports to transport non-oil trade.
8. Making the security of alternative pipelines and ports part of the new defense alliances.

BETH Foresight

The world does not appear likely to replace the Strait of Hormuz with one project; rather, it will replace absolute dependence on it with a graduated network of routes.

In the near term, Saudi Arabia and the UAE will remain capable of moving a significant portion of oil, while Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Iraq remain more exposed, and liquefied natural gas remains the most difficult link.

In the medium term, Yanbu, Fujairah, and Duqm will advance as the ports reshaping the energy map.

In the long term, a regional system may emerge extending from the Gulf to the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, linking oil and gas pipelines, railways, storage facilities, and ports under a single security umbrella.

At that point, Hormuz will not lose its importance, but it will lose its monopoly.

Iran used the strait to prove that the world could not bypass it; but it may, without intending to, have given the world the reason, time, and money to build the route that bypasses it.

When the network of alternatives is complete, Iran will not need to close Hormuz in order to lose it; it may remain open to ships after its strategic importance has already begun to leave it.