The 30-year “123 Agreement” opens the way for U.S. technology and a domestic nuclear fuel cycle, while initiating the congressional review process

Riyadh | BETH

Saudi Arabia and the United States have officially signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, moving the partnership from preliminary approval of a draft to a formal legal framework that could enable the Kingdom to acquire U.S. reactors, nuclear technology, materials, and expertise.

The agreement was signed by Saudi Minister of Energy Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman and U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright. It has a 30-year term and falls under what is known as a “123 Agreement,” named after Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act.

Such an agreement is legally required before American companies can export reactors, nuclear materials, equipment, or sensitive technologies to another country.

However, signing does not mean the agreement has entered into force, nor does it authorize Saudi Arabia to begin uranium enrichment immediately. The agreement must still pass through the U.S. congressional review process, while subsequent transfers of technology, materials, and equipment will require separate licenses and regulatory approvals.

BETH Reported the Development Earlier

On July 18, 2026, BETH published an extensive report titled:

“Saudi Arabia Moves Closer to Possessing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.”

The report revealed that the Trump administration had given preliminary approval to a draft civil nuclear cooperation agreement that could open the door to domestic uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia.

The official signing now confirms the central direction identified in that report and moves the issue from the draft stage to a formal bilateral agreement.

What Has Changed?

Before the signing, the agreement remained a draft awaiting presidential approval and formal conclusion.

It is now a signed legal framework between Riyadh and Washington. Yet several stages remain before implementation:

• Submission of the agreement to the U.S. Congress.
• A review period of 90 days of continuous congressional session.
• The absence of a joint resolution by the House and Senate rejecting it.
• Completion of subsequent regulatory and export-licensing procedures.
• Approval of specific transfers involving reactors, materials, equipment, or sensitive technology.

The important distinction is therefore between three stages:

Signing the agreement, bringing it into force, and beginning actual nuclear operations.

The first has taken place. The second awaits legal review. The third will require projects, facilities, licenses, inspections, and years of technical development.

Enrichment at the Heart of the Agreement

Saudi Arabia’s right to develop a domestic nuclear fuel cycle—including the production of low-enriched uranium—has long been the most sensitive issue in negotiations with Washington.

The Kingdom possesses domestic uranium resources and has repeatedly stated its intention to benefit from them across the fuel cycle: from mining and yellowcake production to enrichment and the eventual manufacture of nuclear fuel.

Available information indicates that the agreement does not impose the absolute prohibition on enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing that Washington previously required in some regional agreements.

Instead, Saudi Arabia and the United States are expected to conduct a joint study over the next two years to determine the Kingdom’s need for domestic enrichment and the conditions under which it could be developed.

This does not amount to immediate operational authorization. But it preserves the possibility of local enrichment within a negotiated legal, technical, and safeguards framework.

Safeguards and International Scrutiny

Because uranium enrichment is a dual-use technology, the agreement will face close scrutiny in Washington and within the international non-proliferation system.

Low-enriched uranium can be used as fuel for civilian nuclear reactors. At substantially higher enrichment levels, however, the same technological process can produce material suitable for nuclear weapons.

According to the information currently available, the agreement does not require Saudi Arabia to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, which grants inspectors wider access to declared and undeclared sites.

Instead, Riyadh and Washington are expected to establish a bilateral safeguards arrangement. Its full provisions, inspection mechanisms, and relationship with the IAEA have not yet been publicly disclosed.

These details will be central to the debate in Congress, because they will determine the balance between Saudi Arabia’s right to develop a peaceful nuclear industry and U.S. commitments to preventing nuclear proliferation.

Analysis

From Importing Reactors to Owning the Industry

The significance of the agreement extends far beyond the construction of nuclear power plants.

If the final framework preserves Saudi Arabia’s ability to develop parts of the nuclear fuel cycle domestically, the Kingdom will not merely import reactors and purchase fuel from abroad. It will be able to build knowledge, expertise, infrastructure, and industrial capacity inside the country.

That could include:

• Uranium exploration and mining.
• Yellowcake production.
• Nuclear-fuel development.
• Reactor construction and operation.
• Training Saudi engineers, scientists, and technicians.
• Building regulatory, safety, and radiation-monitoring capabilities.
• Developing supply chains and specialized nuclear industries.

The strategic value therefore lies in possessing the knowledge and industrial base—not simply purchasing nuclear-generated electricity.

Why Did Washington Agree?

The United States understands that rejecting Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions would not necessarily stop the Kingdom’s program.

Riyadh has other potential partners capable of constructing reactors and providing nuclear technology. A rigid American position could therefore exclude U.S. companies from a major market while reducing Washington’s ability to influence the program’s standards and safeguards.

The United States faced a clear choice:

Either maintain strict conditions and risk losing both the market and strategic influence, or negotiate a framework that keeps the Saudi program connected to American technology, regulation, and long-term partnership.

The agreement suggests that Washington chose engagement over exclusion.

What Does Saudi Arabia Gain?

Saudi Arabia is seeking to introduce nuclear power into its national energy mix to generate electricity, support water desalination, reduce domestic consumption of oil and gas, and preserve greater quantities of hydrocarbons for export and higher-value industries.

But the larger gain is strategic.

The agreement gives the Kingdom a pathway to move from being a consumer of nuclear technology to becoming a participant in its production, operation, and development.

If implemented effectively, it could support:

• Energy security.
• Industrial diversification.
• Scientific and technical localization.
• Highly specialized employment.
• Greater negotiating leverage in international energy markets.
• A stronger Saudi position within the global nuclear industry.

The Real Test

The agreement’s importance will not ultimately be measured by the signing ceremony alone.

The real test will be whether it survives congressional review, what safeguards are adopted, how enrichment is defined, which technologies are approved for transfer, and how much of the resulting industry is localized inside Saudi Arabia.

A nuclear agreement can remain a legal framework.

Or it can become the foundation of a national industry.

The difference will be determined by implementation.

Conclusion

On July 18, Saudi Arabia was moving closer to possessing a domestic nuclear fuel cycle.

Following the official signing, the legal framework that could open the way toward that objective is now in place—subject to congressional review, regulatory approvals, licensing requirements, and the final safeguards arrangements.

The agreement does not mean that Saudi Arabia has begun enrichment, nor that U.S. nuclear technology will be transferred immediately.

But it marks a strategic shift: the Saudi nuclear program is moving from years of negotiation toward an institutional partnership capable of reshaping the Kingdom’s energy, industrial, and technological future.

If the agreement passes its remaining stages while preserving the possibility of a domestic fuel cycle, it will be more than an energy accord.

It will represent a transformation in Saudi Arabia’s nuclear standing—and in the rules governing strategic cooperation between Riyadh and Washington.