Prepared and Analyzed by | Strategic Media Department – BETH News Agency

Introduction: A Question Beyond One Individual

The name Mojtaba Khamenei is no longer merely another figure within the power circles of Tehran.

As discussions grow about his potential role in leading the system after his father, Ali Khamenei, the question has shifted from the individual himself to something far larger:

Is what is happening inside Iran today a sign of a fracture within the regime…
or the beginning of a stronger structural reconfiguration?

Why Does His Selection Spark Controversy?

The Iranian system — theoretically — is not hereditary.

The Supreme Leader is selected by a body composed of hardline clerics.

The position is also expected to go to a religious figure possessing:

High juristic authority according to strict Twelver Shiite doctrine

Broad recognition within the religious seminaries

Long experience in Shiite religious authority

Yet Mojtaba’s name generates controversy for a clear reason:

He is not known for possessing a major religious authority compared with several senior clerics in Iran.

This is where the real question begins:

the transformation within the Iranian system.

The Shift Inside the Iranian System

Over the past decades, the balance of power inside Iran has gradually changed.

In the early years following the revolution, the religious establishment stood at the center of decision-making.

But over time another actor emerged with far greater influence:

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — the institution responsible for exporting the revolution and interfering in neighboring countries and beyond.

The IRGC is no longer merely a military force.

It has become:

A major economic actor

A powerful security apparatus controlling key state structures

Why Might the System Prefer a Figure Like Mojtaba?

Analysts generally discuss three main explanations.

1. The Security-State Option

Selecting a figure close to the circles of the IRGC may indicate that:

The system is shifting toward a more security-driven leadership model and a less religious one.

In such a scenario, the Supreme Leader becomes:

A political façade for a system managed by powerful security institutions.

2. Preventing a Power Struggle

The absence of a strong leader such as Ali Khamenei could open the door to conflict between:

Clerical authorities

The Revolutionary Guard

Political factions inside the regime

Choosing a figure from within the family may therefore serve as a temporary solution:

to avoid a dangerous internal division of power.

3. The Moment of War

During major crises, regimes tend to prioritize:

Continuity

Avoiding sudden structural changes

Introducing a familiar name within the system may send a message that:

the leadership remains stable despite pressure
— a form of psychological reassurance amid the ruins of war.

Does This Reflect Weakness in the System?

This question lies at the core of the current debate.

Two opposing interpretations exist.

The First Interpretation: A Sign of Weakness

Selecting a figure lacking major religious weight may indicate:

A shortage of broadly accepted candidates within the system

Fear of conflict among power centers

An attempt to manage a difficult transitional phase

In this case, the decision would be more of a necessity than a strategic choice.

The Second Interpretation: A Reconfiguration of Power

Another interpretation suggests something different.

What is happening may not be a sign of weakness.

Rather, it could represent a transformation in the very nature of the system.

Instead of a religious system led by clerical authorities, Iran may be moving toward:

A model where security and military institutions dominate decision-making.

The Question of Real Power

The deeper question in Iran today is not:

Who the Supreme Leader is.

But rather:

Who truly holds power inside the system.

Power in Iran has evolved into a complex network combining:

The religious establishment

The Revolutionary Guard

Security institutions

Economic elites linked to the regime

BETH Reading

What is unfolding in Iran today may represent a pivotal moment in the regime’s history.

If Mojtaba Khamenei’s rise reflects a shortage of viable options within the clerical establishment, it may signal internal fractures.

But if it results from a decision by security power centers, it may indicate that Iran is entering a new phase:

A system less religious… and more security-driven.

In both cases, the central question remains open:

Are we witnessing the beginning of structural instability within the Iranian regime…
or a stronger reconfiguration of its foundations?

Appendix

Has the War Revealed the Reality of Iran’s Power?

The most accurate answer is that it has revealed an important part of it — but not all of it.

Recent American and Israeli strikes have shown that Iran is not the closed fortress it long portrayed itself to be.
The battlefield has reached the Iranian interior, strategic military sites and infrastructure have been targeted, and Tehran’s ability to impose an image of absolute deterrence has been weakened.

At the same time, Iran still possesses tools capable of disrupting events beyond its borders, particularly in the fields of energy, maritime routes, and asymmetric warfare.

What Has Been Revealed?

The war has revealed that Iranian power is not a power of decisive victory.

For years Iran demonstrated its ability to threaten, build networks of influence, and construct the image of an untouchable force.

Yet the current war has shown that this power cannot fully prevent penetration, cannot prevent the battlefield from reaching its own territory, and cannot provide complete immunity when core leadership or strategic structures are targeted.

The emergence of Mojtaba Khamenei’s name during wartime pressure also suggests the regime needed to quickly reaffirm an image of continuity.

This does not necessarily indicate collapse — but it does show that Iran’s aura of resilience has faced a serious test.

What Has Not Yet Been Revealed?

What remains uncertain is Iran’s capacity to prolong the cost of war.

Iran may not have demonstrated decisive military superiority, but it still possesses the ability to make conflict extremely costly.

The most evident example appeared in the Strait of Hormuz, where disruptions affected shipping routes, exports declined in neighboring states, companies began searching for alternative supply routes, oil prices surged beyond sensitive levels, and global markets experienced clear shock.

This is not the power of victory.

It is the power of disruption.

Is Iran a “Paper Tiger”?

Reality suggests something more nuanced.

Describing Iran as a “paper tiger” underestimates the danger it still poses.

Iran retains:

Missile capabilities

Drone warfare tools

Cyber warfare instruments

Long experience in managing indirect conflict

Yet the war has also shown that this power is stronger at disruption than at decisive resolution, and far more capable of destabilizing than constructing.

This distinction is crucial.

What Cards Might Iran Still Hold?

Four potential strategic tools remain:

Pressure on global energy routes and maritime navigation

Cyber retaliation, with increasing digital attacks and infiltration attempts

Strategic patience and endurance, relying on experience surviving sanctions and prolonged pressure

Proxy networks and indirect actors, even if their effectiveness fluctuates

But Can These Tools Change the Outcome?

Not necessarily.

Iran’s remaining tools may increase the cost of war, but they do not guarantee a strategic shift in its direction.

Disrupting Hormuz harms the world — but it also harms Iran itself by deepening isolation and economic pressure.

Cyber and indirect attacks may disturb adversaries, yet they cannot fully compensate for losses in leadership structures or the erosion of deterrence.

Thus, Iran’s remaining cards may not lead to victory — but rather prevent others from achieving an easy one.

What Does the War Reveal About Iran’s Power Structure?

Iran’s power has been built on three layers:

A symbolic layer rooted in ideological legitimacy and revolutionary rhetoric

A hard layer built on the Revolutionary Guard, security apparatuses, and missile capabilities

An extended layer based on proxies, influence networks, and regional disruption capacity

The current war has clearly struck the first layer, severely tested the second, but has not entirely dismantled the third.

The regime therefore faces a strategic choice:

Either acknowledge that its old aura of ideological dominance has weakened,

Or reshape itself into a more security-centric and less ideological system.

The Deeper Reading

The war suggests that Iran’s real power does not lie in building a new Middle East.

Rather, it lies in preventing others from building a stable Middle East without accounting for it.

Iran is not a model power.

It is a strategic complication.

Not a force of prosperity, but a force of disruption.

When heavily pressured, it does not always respond as a conventional state, but as a system that sees its own losses as something that must translate into broader regional and global costs.

This is what makes it dangerous — and what also reveals its limits.

BETH Summary

What the war has revealed so far is that Iran is weaker than it claimed — yet more dangerous than some prefer to believe.

It is not an impregnable power.

But neither is it fragile paper.

It possesses enough capability to disrupt geopolitical equations — though not necessarily enough to impose a stable new one.

The ultimate question therefore remains:

Has Iran truly been exposed…
or does it still retain enough leverage to destabilize the region further before its vulnerabilities overtake its capacity to inflict damage?

BETH Conclusion

The most sensitive question surrounding the current conflict remains:

Is the goal of this war to change the behavior of the Iranian regime…
or to change the regime itself?

Ending the region’s cycle of tension will not come merely through weakening military capabilities.

It requires altering the equation that for decades allowed Iran to derive its legitimacy from permanent confrontation.

Modern states are not built on missiles or ideological slogans.

They are built on economics, science, and integration with the global system.

Yet solving the Iranian dilemma cannot be achieved through a single military strike.

If it happens at all, it will likely emerge through three intersecting paths:

Internal transformation within Iranian society, when the cost of maintaining the system becomes greater than the cost of changing it.

Sustained international pressure, pushing the regime toward behavioral change or political reform.

A redefinition of Iran’s regional role, from a revolutionary state exporting conflict to a normal state participating in economic and regional cooperation.

Yet another, more complex possibility remains.

The continued existence of Iran as a destabilizing force may serve certain global interests by justifying military alliances and maintaining the region in a state of constant tension.

This raises the decisive question for the future of the Middle East:

Does the world truly seek to resolve the Iranian dilemma…
or merely to manage it?