The foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan pave the way for an urgent meeting of the chiefs of staff to support Saudi Arabia after the Houthi attacks; the Security Council gives Riyadh broader international political cover, while the agreement shifts from institutional building to testing the mechanisms of joint defense

Prepared and Analyzed by | Strategic Media Department – BETH Agency
Supervision: Abdullah Al-Omairah

The Makkah Joint Defense Agreement is no longer facing the question of establishment, but rather a more direct question:

What does the alliance do when one of its member states comes under attack?

This is the essence of the new development.

In New York, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan discussed the ongoing arrangements to hold an urgent meeting of the chiefs of staff of the three countries, to examine ways of supporting the Kingdom within the framework of the agreement, which stipulates that an attack on any party is considered an attack on all parties. The ministers also discussed the regional situation, maritime security, and the establishment of the secretariat-general, committees, and working groups stemming from the agreement.

The significance here is not in the meeting itself.

Since the agreement was signed in Makkah in August, followed by the first institutional meeting in Istanbul at the end of the same month, the three countries have moved quickly to build a permanent structure: a strategic political and defense committee, a secretariat-general, working groups, and a track for military and defense cooperation. The Istanbul meeting witnessed the alliance’s first institutional decisions, with the participation of the foreign and defense ministers and chiefs of staff of the three countries.

Now, however, the situation is different.

The Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia move the agreement from planning for what might happen to dealing with what has already happened.

From Solidarity to Mechanism

The three ministers condemned the attacks that targeted Makkah and civilian and economic facilities in Saudi Arabia, and affirmed the Kingdom’s right to take whatever measures it deems appropriate to defend its security in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

This is politically important, but it is not new on its own.

What is new is that the condemnation was directly linked to preparations for the meeting of the chiefs of staff.

This is where the real test of the agreement begins:

Will the principle that “an attack on one party is an attack on all” be translated into practical arrangements in air defense, early warning, information sharing, protection of facilities, maritime security, and operational coordination?

These areas have not yet been announced as decisions that have been taken, but they represent the most logical tracks for a military meeting at this level.

Turkish sources also announced that the Turkish chief of staff would travel to Saudi Arabia to participate in the meeting of the chiefs of staff under the Makkah Agreement, but as of Friday evening no official Saudi announcement had been issued confirming his arrival or the start of the meeting. Therefore, what remains confirmed at this stage is the urgent preparation for the meeting, not the announcement of its results.

Security Council Condemns Attacks on Saudi Arabia

In parallel, the UN Security Council’s condemnation of the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia added another dimension to the development.

The Council condemned attacks targeting civilians and energy infrastructure, renewed its condemnation of threats against commercial navigation in the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandab, and called on the Houthis to halt escalation and attacks on civilians and civilian objects. Council members also stressed respect for arms embargo resolutions and support for the Yemeni government and for Yemen’s unity and sovereignty.

More importantly, the discussion within the Council no longer views the Houthis solely as a Yemeni issue.

Their advance toward Bab Al-Mandab, the attacks on Saudi Arabia, the targeting of navigation, and the worsening humanitarian situation inside Yemen are increasingly being read as parts of one crisis affecting regional security and international trade. Recent Council sessions also reflected concern over the displacement of more than 126,000 people amid the ongoing escalation, in addition to 73 United Nations staff members remaining in Houthi detention.

Where Do the Two Tracks Intersect?

This is where the importance of the moment becomes clear.

The Makkah Agreement gives Saudi Arabia an emerging regional defense framework.

The Security Council gives it broader international political cover in confronting Houthi attacks and threats to navigation.

The first raises the question: How will the three countries support one another militarily?

The second broadens the question: How can the international community prevent the Houthis from turning Yemen and the Red Sea into a recurring source of threat to Saudi Arabia and global trade?

This intersection gives Riyadh greater room for action; not because it needs others to defend it, but because it is confronting the threat within a broader network of political legitimacy and defense cooperation.

What Does This Mean for the War?

So far, there is no official indication of a decision to launch joint combat operations under the umbrella of the Makkah Agreement.

But the mere transfer of the file to the chiefs of staff means that the alliance has entered a different phase.

An alliance that, only weeks ago, was discussing structures, committees, defense industries, and joint operations is now discussing how to support a member that is facing actual attacks.

This could first lead to defensive measures with low political risk and high military value: intelligence sharing, integration of surveillance systems, air-defense support, protection of energy routes, Red Sea security, and raising the level of joint readiness.

A move toward direct operations inside Yemen, however, would be a much larger decision and would require a different political and military level.

BETH Reading

The most important shift is not that the Makkah Alliance has begun; that happened in August.

The shift is that it is now facing the first test of its real meaning.

If the chiefs of staff meeting produces a clear mechanism to support Saudi Arabia, the agreement will move from “theoretical deterrence” to deterrence capable of implementation.

If the move remains confined to political coordination, the question will remain open as to the alliance’s ability to turn its provisions into practical tools.

But the presence of two simultaneous factors — a trilateral military move and a unified Security Council position against Houthi escalation — makes this moment different from everything that came before.

Outcomes

The most likely course is for the next phase to begin with defense rather than attack.

That means the Makkah Agreement would focus on strengthening the ability of Saudi Arabia and its partners to prevent targeting, raise the cost of any new attempt, and secure the Red Sea, energy routes, and vital corridors.

If that succeeds, the alliance will have achieved its first objectives.