Prepared and Analyzed by | Strategic Media Department – B | B
Supervised by: Abdullah Alomairah

When negotiations remain stalled for a long period, thinking usually turns to a straightforward question:

Who is obstructing the agreement?

The United States?

Or Iran?

Yet politics is rarely that simple.

In many cases, the problem is not the absence of an agreement itself, but rather the different shape of the agreement each side wants.

And this is where the zone of ambiguity begins.

Is the United States Complicating the Situation?

From one perspective, Washington appears to want an agreement.

But not just any agreement.

It wants an agreement that can be presented domestically as:

A political success.

A strategic victory.

A security guarantee for Israel.

And a gateway to new regional arrangements.

This raises expectations and makes a rapid agreement far more difficult to achieve.

Or Is Iran Complicating the Negotiations?

From another perspective, Tehran appears to be buying time.

It seeks:

To ease pressure.

To preserve its leverage.

And to avoid making major concessions that could be interpreted domestically as a defeat.

As a result, it sometimes appears close to an agreement,

Then far from it.

Close to a settlement,

Then back to complexity.

Or Do Both Sides Need the Complexity?

Here, a more intriguing question emerges.

What if part of the complexity is intentional?

Not necessarily through a secret understanding.

But because complexity serves both sides at certain stages.

The United States needs continued pressure.

Iran needs continued resilience.

And sometimes the gray zone gives both parties room to maneuver that a final agreement would not.

What Is Left Unsaid?

When the same phrases are repeated:

"We are getting closer to an agreement."

Then:

"We are not there yet."

And this cycle repeats over and over,

The disagreement may not be limited to technical details.

It may concern the shape of the region after an agreement.

Who wins?

Who loses?

Who holds influence?

Who guarantees security?

Who pays the political price?

These questions are often more consequential than the terms of the agreement itself.

In-Depth Analysis

Politics is the art of the possible.

But sometimes it is also the art of postponing the impossible.

For that reason, the real question may not be:

Who is complicating the negotiations?

Rather:

Who benefits from keeping them unresolved?

In some international disputes, ambiguity is not merely a consequence of the crisis.

It becomes a tool for managing it.

Perhaps this is why the current negotiations do not resemble a straight road toward either an agreement or a confrontation.

Instead, they look more like a political swing on which everyone is moving.

Between the desire for a solution,

And the fear of its consequences.

A Scene from the Future

The world may later discover that the problem was not the absence of an agreement.

Rather, each side wanted a different agreement from the other.

At that point, the more important question becomes:

Were the negotiations searching for a solution to the crisis?

Or merely a way to manage it for as long as possible?

Is Military Resolution Alone Enough?

Some may respond to this analysis by asking:

If America possesses the power, why does it not simply settle the matter?

Are historical precedents not clear?

Germany surrendered.

Japan surrendered.

And other regimes were brought down by force.

It is a legitimate question.

Yet history itself shows that military victory does not always produce the same outcome.

Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan did not surrender because they suddenly embraced peace.

Their leaders concluded that continuing the war would bring destruction greater than what had already occurred.

In Japan’s case in particular, the decision was not driven solely by American military power.

It was also driven by fear of losing what remained of the state, the people, the emperor, and the political system itself.

In other words:

Power was the instrument of pressure.

But surrender was ultimately a political decision.

This is where today’s dilemma appears.

The question is not:

Can America inflict greater damage on Iran?

Rather:

Can it convince the Iranian system that the cost of continuing has become greater than the cost of retreating?

Political systems do not all behave in the same way.

Some collapse quickly.

Some fight until the very end.

Others prefer maneuvering and buying time rather than surrendering or entering a full-scale confrontation.

For this reason, the current negotiations appear less like a struggle over military capability and more like a struggle over political will.

America is attempting to push Iran toward accepting a particular outcome.

Iran is trying to prevent that outcome from being imposed upon it.

Thus, the real question may not be:

Why doesn’t America finish the job?

Rather:

Does Washington Still Believe That Military Force Alone Can Produce the Middle East It Wants?

Or have the new realities and complexities revealed by the crisis—some of which may not have been fully anticipated in American calculations—begun to push Washington toward reassessing its priorities and strategies?

If the first phase involves containing the Iranian project and reducing the influence of its associated power centers, then the greater challenge begins afterward.

How Is Stability Built?

Can lasting peace be achieved through force alone?

Or does genuine peace require something beyond military balances of power?

President Trump speaks constantly about peace.

Likewise, the Arab Peace Initiative launched by Saudi Arabia in 2002 was founded on the principle that comprehensive peace cannot be achieved without addressing the roots of conflict and securing a degree of justice and mutual acceptance among all parties.

This raises a deeper question:

Is Washington seeking to build a sustainable peace based on understanding, persuasion, and shared interests?

Or is it seeking to impose rapid political and security arrangements in the hope that a fait accompli will eventually evolve into peace?

History shows that agreements can sometimes be imposed.

But lasting peace rarely endures unless the parties themselves are convinced of it rather than compelled into it.

Based on current realities, Washington does not appear capable of achieving its vision through coercion alone.

Attempting to impose regional arrangements that lack sufficient acceptance may not only complicate the path to peace, but also weaken allies’ confidence in American credibility and its ability to honor commitments and obligations.

In a world built on alliances and partnerships, the loss of confidence in a major ally can be a strategic setback no less serious than losing a major war.

It means losing influential partners whose value cannot easily be replaced during periods of major transformation.

The available evidence also suggests that Washington understands that major strategic decisions are not measured solely by their immediate outcomes.

They are also measured by their long-term impact on regional balances and alliances.

For that reason, the United States does not appear inclined to take steps that could ultimately produce political or strategic losses outweighing any potential gains.

Instead, the more likely path is continued consultation and coordination with allies, particularly the Gulf states, which recent events have shown are not peripheral actors in the regional equation, but rather key pillars of stability.

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