Between Shaping the Event and Protecting the Narrative

Prepared and analyzed by | Strategic Media Department – BETH Agency
Supervised by: Abdullah Al-Omira

Introduction

Wars are not fought with weapons alone.

Alongside missiles, aircraft, and military movements, another war is being waged to determine the meaning of what is happening: Who started it? Who won? Who retreated? And who went to negotiations because they wanted to, rather than because they were forced to?

In this war, language does not merely convey the event; it reshapes it. Words may create a victory that was never achieved, conceal a defeat that occurred, present retreat as wisdom, or portray inability as strategic patience.

Hence the importance of examining American and Iranian discourse, not through a single statement or a passing phase, but as two different schools of political communication and wartime media.

What is the nature of each discourse? Which is closer to modern media? Which relies on older traditions of propaganda? Which is closer to the recipient’s mind? And can either of them serve as a reliable source of information?

Not Every State Has One Voice

American discourse does not originate from a single center. There are the president’s statements, releases from the White House and the State Department, and announcements from the Pentagon and military command, alongside an independent press that may contradict and investigate the government’s narrative.

Iran, likewise, does not speak with one voice. There are the Supreme Leader, the presidency, the Foreign Ministry, the Revolutionary Guard, parliament, official and semi-official media outlets, and Iran-aligned groups across the region.

However, the multiplicity of voices in the United States generally operates within a declared institutional system, whereas in Iran it sometimes reflects a deliberate distribution of roles. The Foreign Ministry speaks in diplomatic language, the Revolutionary Guard raises the level of threats, and affiliated platforms publish messages from which the state can later distance itself.

It is therefore insufficient to compare an American statement with an Iranian one. The environment that produced each discourse and the function it performs must also be examined.

American Discourse

From Propaganda to Strategic Communication

The United States’ interest in media influence did not begin with social media. Since the two world wars, and later during the Cold War, Washington has established specialized institutions to address foreign public opinion and present its policies in a form capable of exerting influence.

This activity developed under terms such as public diplomacy, strategic communication, and information operations. The objective was no longer merely to issue a statement or respond to an adversary, but to coordinate words, images, and political and military actions so that, together, they produce a single meaning in the public mind.

Media thus became part of planning, rather than a tool employed after the decision had been made.

Framing the Event

American discourse tends to take the initiative. It does not wait for an event to be completed before describing it; rather, it attempts to establish the framework through which the event will be interpreted before other parties present their narratives.

This is known as “preemptive framing” or “narrative preemption,” whereby the state announces its interpretation early, pushing adversaries and media outlets to discuss the event using the vocabulary it has selected.

When this process succeeds, attention shifts from questioning the American narrative to awaiting the other party’s response to it. Washington then secures its first advantage: determining the subject, language, and timing of the debate.

The Language of News and the Making of Action

Institutional American discourse uses the tools of modern journalism: precise timing, numbers, names and official titles, maps and images, press briefings, and statements attributed to identified entities.

This approach gives the statement a news format suitable for rapid dissemination. The existence of a strong domestic press, experienced and open professional oversight, and specialized research centers also makes it possible to review official data and expose any contradictions it may contain.

This does not mean that American discourse is free from disinformation or the withholding of information. It does, however, operate within an environment that increases the likelihood of both being uncovered and broadens the scope of accountability.

In its more recent phase, words have become part of implementing decisions. The threat of sanctions affects markets before sanctions are imposed; the announcement of a military movement may change an adversary’s calculations; and talk of imminent negotiations may lower oil prices and mobilize mediators.

This is known as “performative communication,” in which words do not merely describe reality but constitute an action intended to change it.

The Trumpian Version

Donald Trump represents a different phase within American discourse. He shifted presidential communication from the institution to the individual, and from the calculated statement to direct and continuous communication.

His discourse is based on short sentences, repetition, exaggeration, dividing the world into winners and losers, and presenting events as the greatest, most dangerous, or best in history.

He also sometimes announces expected outcomes before they are finalized, turning the possibility of an agreement into an imminent agreement, initial contact into negotiations, and a military plan into a postponed victory.

This approach belongs to the “attention economy.” It seeks the phrase that dominates the news and compels everyone to repeat it before seeking the most accurate formulation.

Trumpian discourse is therefore more modern than traditional political media in its method and pace, but it employs one of propaganda’s oldest tools: exaggeration.

As a whole, American discourse seeks to seize the initiative, define the event’s framework, reassure the domestic public and allies, pressure the adversary, influence markets and decisions, and present the United States as the power that drives events.

Iranian Discourse

A Discourse Born of Revolution

The basic structure of contemporary Iranian discourse dates back to the 1979 Revolution and then to the Iran–Iraq War, when the vocabulary of revolution, resistance, arrogance, steadfastness, sacrifice, divine victory, and foreign conspiracy became firmly established.

This discourse was not originally constructed to present neutral news, but to mobilize the public, protect the regime, and interpret conflict as a moral and historical confrontation between right and wrong.

It therefore tends toward grand language that transcends the details of the event and connects the current battle to a long history of victimhood and resistance.

Rhetoric Before News

Information does not always occupy the center of the Iranian message. The moral position, symbolism, and threat may take precedence over it.

Instead of clearly announcing the scale of a loss, the discourse speaks of the “failure of the aggression.” Instead of acknowledging the need for negotiations, dialogue is described as “forcing the enemy to recognize rights.” Instead of presenting a retreat as a concession, it is redefined as a tactical step.

This language is closer to a political declaration or a mobilizational speech than to news in the modern journalistic sense. Its first question is not: What happened? Rather: How should the public understand what happened?

Semantic Maneuvering

Iranian discourse possesses a clear ability to employ subtle distinctions between words. It differentiates between contact and negotiation, messages and talks, mediation and a direct meeting, coordination and direction, and an ally and a proxy.

These distinctions perform political and security functions. Through them, Iran can discuss a proposal through a mediator and then announce that it is not negotiating with the United States. It can also support an armed group and then deny issuing direct orders to it.

This method is classified under “strategic ambiguity” and “plausible deniability,” whereby the relationship remains in place while direct responsibility is difficult to prove.

This approach may intersect with certain cultural and political legacies, including the concept of taqiyya. In contemporary Iranian practice, however, it is closer to a state instrument used to manage conflict, maneuver, and manufacture ambiguity. The particular culture of society and the political system undoubtedly has a direct or indirect influence on the formation of this discourse.

Rhetorical Deterrence and Saving Face

Iran recognizes the wide gap between itself and the United States in military and economic capabilities and therefore attempts to compensate for part of it psychologically.

It uses language suggesting that any attack will be met with an unlimited response, that the adversary is incapable of bearing the cost of confrontation, and that Iran possesses cards capable of changing the region and the world.

This does not mean that all threats are empty. Iran possesses influential capabilities and genuine instruments of pressure. However, its language expands the image of those capabilities and magnifies the anticipated cost of their use in the adversary’s mind. This is “rhetorical deterrence.”

This discourse addresses the domestic audience before the external one. The regime can negotiate, but it does not want to appear compelled to do so. It can accept a compromise, but presents it as the extraction of rights. It may halt escalation, but describes this as a result of the strength of Iranian deterrence.

The discourse thus performs a “face-saving” function, reinterpreting decisions in a way that prevents the regime from appearing to have submitted to pressure.

Traditional in Essence, Modern in Its Tools

Iranian discourse can be described as traditional, revolutionary, and mobilizational in its core content, while employing modern tools: digital platforms, official and semi-official accounts, cross-border networks of allies, short videos, electronic campaigns, and messages distributed among different entities.

It is an old discourse in its symbolic structure, modern in its means of dissemination, and advanced in distributing roles and preserving room for denial.

Which Is More Modern?

Institutional American discourse is closer to the modern political communication model that has benefited from public relations, public diplomacy, and the sciences of public-opinion measurement.

Trumpian discourse, meanwhile, represents a phase that may be described as “post-media.” It bypasses journalistic institutions, addresses the public directly, and measures its success by the amount of attention and speed of circulation more than by complete adherence to accuracy.

By contrast, the essence of Iranian discourse belongs to an older model based on revolutionary oratory and ideological mobilization, but it has added the techniques of networked communication, psychological warfare, and distributed ambiguity.

American discourse is therefore more modern in constructing the message, while Iranian discourse is older in its language without being backward in its instruments of influence. Indeed, it may be more complex in managing contradictions and distributing messages.

The Two Discourses by the Standards of Modern Journalism

Modern journalistic language is based on source clarity, defining the time and place, separating news from opinion, presenting verifiable evidence, consistency among statements, correcting errors, and allowing room for questions.

According to these standards, institutional American discourse is more advanced because the statements of its institutions are more specific and properly attributed, and are issued within an environment that allows the press to discuss and review them. This advantage, however, does not automatically apply to every American political statement, particularly when exaggeration overwhelms accuracy.

Iranian discourse is further removed from the modern journalistic model when it presents interpretation before information, withholds details, or allows multiple entities to issue conflicting narratives. Nevertheless, the discourse of the Iranian Foreign Ministry displays a good level of diplomatic formulation: it does not say everything, but it knows what it does not want to say.

The Recipient and the Source of Reference

In terms of ease of understanding, American discourse, particularly in its direct version, is more advanced because it is short and clear, links words to a specific action, and presents a result that is easy to remember. These characteristics make it more accessible to the general public and the undecided recipient.

Iranian discourse is more influential among audiences already aligned with its narrative and beliefs because it appeals to identity, dignity, and historical memory, and provides its supporters with an interpretation that preserves the image of strength and steadfastness.

American discourse is more capable of expanding its audience, while Iranian discourse is more capable of insulating its core audience. Both, however, lose the informed recipient when the gap between words and reality repeatedly widens.

No political discourse in wartime can serve as the sole source of truth. An American statement is a reference for what Washington wants to announce, but it is not sufficient proof that what it announced has occurred. An Iranian statement is a reference for the position Tehran wishes to present, but it is not conclusive evidence that what it denies does not exist.

Nevertheless, American institutional statements generally possess a higher degree of verifiability because they include details and figures and are subject to journalistic, parliamentary, and legal review mechanisms. The Iranian narrative requires greater caution because of the multiplicity of centers producing the discourse, limited independent access to information, and the use of ambiguity and denial in managing conflict.

Professionally, the best approach is to begin with independent evidence, followed by the convergence of sources, documented institutional statements, and then leaders’ statements as expressions of positions and intentions. Affiliated media outlets and unofficial accounts are indicators of the direction of discourse, not evidence of facts.

The Gulf and the Making of Discourse

Examining the two discourses leads to a question closer to home:

Where does Arab media stand, particularly in the Gulf states, which possess the financial and technological capabilities required to build modern and influential discourse?

The Gulf states do not lack funding, platforms, or access to advanced technologies. What they lack, to varying degrees, is the transition from financing content to building permanent institutions for the creation of discourse, and from measuring views to measuring the transformation produced by the message in the recipient’s knowledge, position, and decision.

The United States did not build its influence through spokespersons alone, but through a system comprising experts in media, politics, psychology, sociology, language, data analysis, and public-opinion measurement. These experts work to understand the audience before addressing it, construct the message, select its timing, test it, measure its impact, and then correct it.

The Gulf states can establish similar institutions and perhaps excel in certain fields, but this requires a vision that regards discourse as a strategic industry, rather than a seasonal campaign or a temporary response to a crisis.

We need institutions that bring together practicing journalists, researchers, and specialists in political communication, social psychology, behavioral analysis, languages and cultures, artificial intelligence, and trend measurement.

Their task should not be to embellish decisions or produce expressions of praise, but to explain policies, anticipate questions, identify areas of misunderstanding, and address each audience in the language it understands without altering the truth.

An Influencer Is Not an Institution

Part of Arab media reduces media influence to social media and then reduces social media to a group of people described as “influencers.”

The problem does not lie in benefiting from widely followed personalities, as some can reach groups that traditional institutions find difficult to access.

The problem begins when reach is treated as influence, the number of followers as evidence of trust, and the influencer replaces the journalist, researcher, and institution.

An influencer can deliver the message, but does not necessarily create discourse. Influencers may increase views without possessing the knowledge that enables them to explain or defend an issue.

Their audiences are also often attached to their personalities and daily content, and may leave them as quickly as they gathered around them. Their influence is therefore rapid and reversible, and cannot, on its own, build public memory or a stable source of reference.

An influencer is a distribution channel, not a knowledge institution.

Why Is Attention Focused on Them?

Influencers are easy to access, their digital results are rapid, their numbers are ready to be displayed, and their cost is lower than that of building a journalistic institution, research center, or network of correspondents.

They also give the commissioning entity an immediate sense that it has reached the public, even if the public’s understanding or position has not changed.

This is where reaching the audience, attracting its attention, and influencing its awareness and behavior become confused. An influencer may achieve the first and second levels, but the third requires accumulated knowledge, a credible message, and institutions that remain after the campaign ends and the platform disappears.

From Platform to Institution

Journalistic institutions that once set the agenda and produced writers, experts, and correspondents have declined across the Arab world, without being replaced by modern institutions that perform the same function using the tools of the age.

Many platforms have emerged, but few possess a research newsroom, an impact-measurement unit, a discourse-analysis center, or a multidisciplinary network of experts.

We have consequently acquired more content and fewer authoritative references, faster reach and shorter influence, and a broad presence without a parallel capacity to shape the international narrative or address undecided audiences.

The Gulf does not need to replicate the American model literally, but rather to benefit from its institutional logic: establishing centers for constructing and analyzing discourse, units for early media warning and trend monitoring, measuring cognitive and behavioral impact, preparing messages for local, Arab, and international audiences, investing in journalists and researchers, and establishing multilingual platforms that understand the recipient’s culture before addressing it.

This also requires connecting media to decision-making centers without turning it into an echo that loses credibility, and building institutions that endure for years instead of campaigns that begin with a crisis and end when it is over.

Conclusion

American discourse seeks to precede the event and define its name and meaning, while Iranian discourse seeks to contain it and reinterpret it in a manner that protects the regime’s image.

The first relies on clarity, speed, and initiative, but may go too far in exaggeration and creating expectations. The second relies on ambiguity, rhetoric, and multiple meanings, but may lose the trust of recipients beyond its own audience because of insufficient information and repeated contradictions.

In the Gulf, financial and technological capabilities and expertise are available. However, the power of discourse cannot be purchased through follower counts, built by hosting celebrities, or measured by the spread of a hashtag for a few hours.

The creation of discourse requires cumulative knowledge, professional expertise, freedom to diagnose shortcomings, and the ability to measure results honestly.

If Arab media continues to view influence solely through the window of influencers, it will remain capable of creating noise rather than authority: present on screens, but absent from the mind that makes decisions.

Authority is not created by a loud voice, the beauty of rhetoric, or the speed of dissemination.

Authority is created by evidence.

__________

This examination drew on the history of American public diplomacy and its role in addressing societies and responding to public opinion, as well as studies describing the dominance of the “culture of resistance” over Iranian discourse since the 1979 Revolution, combined with pragmatism and denial.