Tehran denies expanding the war despite Hormuz and attacks across the region, while Washington offers it a final chance under the pressure of force

BETH | B

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian denied on Tuesday that his country intends to expand the scope of the war, saying that Iran is defending its borders and does not want the fighting to continue.

However, describing Iran’s actions as border defense raises an obvious question: How can restrictions on navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, along with missile and drone attacks directed at Gulf states and Jordan, be placed within the boundaries of defending Iranian territory?

In Washington, Republican Senator Rick Scott, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, expressed doubts about the prospects for success in the new round of negotiations, while supporting President Donald Trump’s decision to give diplomacy another opportunity.

Scott argued that Iran would continue seeking to acquire a nuclear weapon unless its capabilities were completely destroyed. He called for keeping the military option on the table and preparing to deliver a decisive strike if negotiations fail.

Trump had confirmed that the United States was holding talks with Iran and described them as its “last chance” to sign an agreement and avoid an escalation of U.S. attacks. This coincided with continued limited vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and no clear indication that the talks had affected maritime navigation as of Tuesday morning.

Defense by the Iranian Definition

Tehran does not deny the geographical expansion of its operations, but redefines that expansion as defense.

According to the Iranian logic, a strike beyond the country’s borders does not constitute an expansion of the war if it targets a facility or country that Tehran believes contributed to the attack against it or hosted a U.S. force.

The geography of “defense” thus expands to include the Gulf, Jordan, and maritime corridors, while the official discourse continues to insist that Iran does not want to widen the confrontation.

The countries receiving the missiles, however, do not measure the war according to the attacker’s definition. They measure it by where the missiles land and the threat they pose to their security.

Pezeshkian’s statement therefore carries a message of de-escalation in its language, but it will have no effect unless followed by an actual halt to the attacks, the safe reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and a clear commitment not to target countries in the region.

A Chance Under Arms

The current negotiations do not represent a return to traditional diplomacy. They are taking place under direct military and economic pressure.

Trump is not offering open-ended dialogue. He is presenting Iran with a final opportunity linked to a signable agreement, while keeping U.S. forces ready to act.

Rick Scott’s position reveals that a current within Washington does not believe Iranian conduct can be changed through negotiations. It views any agreement that does not end with the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear capabilities as postponing the confrontation rather than ending it.

Tehran is therefore facing a test that goes beyond accepting a seat at the negotiating table: Will it offer measurable and verifiable commitments, or return to using language and intermediaries to buy time?

Russia Enters Electronically

A warning from former U.S. Secretary of State and former CIA Director Mike Pompeo has added a new dimension to the confrontation.

Pompeo cited a media report stating that Russia is providing Iran with advanced electronic intelligence, including satellite reconnaissance imagery and signals intelligence obtained from communications, radar emissions, and military systems.

If confirmed, this would indicate that Russian-Iranian cooperation has moved beyond political support and shared interests to operational assistance that helps Tehran monitor U.S. movements, improve early warning, and reduce the impact of the U.S. information advantage.

This support does not necessarily mean that Russia is entering the war directly. Moscow can assist Iran and increase the cost of U.S. operations while maintaining enough distance to prevent the confrontation from developing into a Russian-American clash.

The warning also reveals that the war is no longer confined to two powers. It has become a point of attraction for an international axis bringing together Iran, Russia, and China, even though the level and objectives of each country’s involvement differ.

The Most Likely Outcomes

An Agreement Beginning with Hormuz

A temporary agreement on navigation through the Strait of Hormuz remains more achievable in the short term than a nuclear settlement because it addresses an urgent threat placing pressure on global energy markets and trade.

Its success could build a limited degree of confidence that would allow the parties to move on to the nuclear file.

Negotiations Under Different Names

Communications may continue through Oman or other mediating countries. Washington may describe them as negotiations, while Iran calls them an exchange of messages or discussions over maritime arrangements.

This scenario gives Tehran time and space to preserve its image, but it will quickly collide with Trump’s diminishing patience.

A More Severe Strike

If the deadline expires without a clear document, Washington may move from pressure to more severe military operations targeting nuclear and missile capabilities and command centers.

However, expanding the strikes could drive Iran to increase its attacks against maritime corridors and countries in the region rather than surrender immediately.

Expansion of the Hidden War

Russia and China may not appear militarily on the battlefield, but intelligence, technical, and economic support could prolong Iran’s ability to withstand pressure and transform the war into a broader electronic and information confrontation.

The Real Test

The test does not lie in Pezeshkian saying that Iran does not want to expand the war, nor in Trump announcing that talks are underway.

The test is whether Tehran will stop what it describes as defense beyond its borders, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and accept verifiable nuclear restrictions.

The United States, meanwhile, must translate the phrase “last chance” into clear conditions, a defined deadline, and a political exit that prevents negotiations from continuing indefinitely without making war the only option.

In the middle, Saudi Arabia is working along two complementary tracks: leading the collective protection of maritime corridors and using diplomacy to prevent U.S. pressure from developing into an open regional war.

For now, Iran says it does not want to expand the war. But war is not measured by what states say about their intentions.

It is measured by where their missiles land.