A Reading of the Interconnections

Prepared and Analyzed by
Strategic Media Department – BETH | B
Supervised by Abdullah Al-Omairah

The region is no longer facing a single question:

Will the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding succeed?

Rather, it is facing a deeper one:

Who wants this document to succeed, and who fears its success?

The succession of events reveals that the agreement has entered not only the implementation phase, but also a struggle over its interpretation, dilution, expansion, or even collapse.

The First Equation: Iran Is Not Defending Lebanon… It Is Defending Its Arm

When the Iranian delegation threatens to withdraw from negotiations if Israeli attacks on Lebanon continue, the question is not: Has Iran become responsible for Lebanon?

The more precise question is:

Is Iran concerned about Lebanon, or about Hezbollah?

For Tehran, Lebanon is not merely a humanitarian issue, nor an independent Arab arena. Rather, it is a forward position within Iran's deterrence architecture. Therefore, any Israeli strikes that weaken Hezbollah effectively diminish one of Iran’s most important cards beyond its borders.

Here lies the core of the crisis:

Washington wants to test Iran’s commitments.

Israel wants to break Iran’s regional arms.

And Tehran wants to preserve those arms as guarantees of influence, not as liabilities to be surrendered.

The Second Equation: Trump Wants an Agreement… But on the Terms of the Victor

Trump does not want a return to war if he can secure a clear agreement within sixty days.

At the same time, he does not want an agreement that appears to be a gift to Tehran.

That is why he combines optimism with threats.

He speaks of an opportunity for settlement, while reminding everyone that failure will lead to measures the Iranians will not welcome.

This means that what matters to Trump now is not peace as an abstract value, but rather an agreement that can be marketed domestically and internationally as an American victory.

His message is simple:

I stopped the war, opened the door to an agreement, but I did not abandon strength.

The Third Equation: Netanyahu Wants Israel’s Security… And Perhaps More Political Time

Netanyahu belongs to a school of thought that believes Israel’s security is not built on promises, but on reducing threats through force before they evolve into greater dangers.

Therefore, the continuation of strikes in Lebanon despite the de-escalation track indicates that Tel Aviv does not want Hezbollah’s future to become hostage to a U.S.-Iranian table in Switzerland.

There is also a political dimension that cannot be ignored.

The continuation of war gives Netanyahu room for domestic maneuvering.

As long as fronts remain open, the argument of “security first” remains powerful.

And the closer a settlement comes, the closer the question of political accountability becomes.

Which makes the following question legitimate:

Is Netanyahu’s era approaching its end?

Not necessarily immediately.

But every major settlement in the region places wartime leaders before a new test:

What comes after war?

The Fourth Equation: Washington Pressures Israel Because It Does Not Want the Document to Fail

If Trump asks Netanyahu to stop, and if Vance warns against Israeli interference in American politics, then Washington clearly fears that Israel could shift from being a strategic partner into a factor disrupting a negotiating process that the United States wants to own.

This tension does not represent an American-Israeli rupture.

Rather, it reflects a difference in priorities.

What matters to Washington now is the success of the agreement, or at least giving it a fair chance.

What matters to Israel is preventing Hezbollah and Iran from exploiting the agreement to rebuild their strength.

And this is a dangerous gap.

Because Washington is thinking about “the grand bargain”—containing Iran both nuclear-wise and regionally, preventing war, and securing the stability of the region, energy flows, and strategic routes—

while Israel is focused on “the immediate threat.”

The Fifth Equation: The Gulf Does Not Want an Agreement That Beautifies the Threat

What matters to the Gulf states and the Arab world is not merely ending the war.

It is ending the war without giving Iran a free hand once again.

The Gulf does not want an open conflict that raises risks to energy, navigation, and stability.

But neither does it want an agreement that allows Iran to retain its doctrine of exporting the revolution and maintaining its regional arms.

Thus, the Gulf question differs from the American question.

Washington may ask:

Has Iran complied on the nuclear issue?

But the Gulf asks:

Has Iran changed its regional behavior?

And that is the deeper test.

Will the Iranian System Remain As It Is?

Most likely, Washington is not seeking to overthrow the Iranian regime directly.

Rather, it seeks to tame it.

Regime change is an open gamble with uncertain consequences.

Taming it means pushing it to accept new limits on its nuclear and regional conduct.

But the problem is that the Iranian system was historically built on the concept of a revolution that transcends borders, not merely on the framework of the nation-state.

Therefore, taming it requires more than a signature.

It requires a change in behavior.

And here lies the greatest dilemma:

Can a system be tamed without abandoning the doctrine that gives it its identity?

Who Wants to Prolong the War?

Not everyone who fires a shot seeks a full-scale war.

But some actors want to keep the flames burning just enough to derail the agreement.

Regional proxies fear calm, because calm deprives them of their function.

Hezbollah does not want to be transformed from a force of “deterrence” into a subject of negotiations.

And some networks of influence in Iraq do not want to lose their value as instruments of pressure. Reports have indicated that the Revolutionary Guard established secret cells in Iraq targeting Gulf states hosting American forces, reinforcing the idea that some pressure tools may operate outside traditional channels.

And here the conclusion becomes clear:

The document was signed by states. But disruption may come from the proxies.

Are We Facing a New Middle East?

Yes, but not in the romantic sense.

The new Middle East will not be born at a press conference, nor will it suddenly emerge after the signing of a memorandum of understanding.

Rather, it will emerge from a long struggle between two different visions for the region.

One vision sees the future in economics, investment, trade corridors, regional integration, and the prioritization of shared interests over old conflicts.

The other still believes that influence is built through proxies, wars, crisis management, and the imposition of dominance by force.

And this is not about Iran alone.

Iran’s revolutionary project, the export of influence, and the use of armed proxies represent an obstacle to a more stable Middle East.

On the other hand, the continuation of Israel’s security-driven and militarized mindset, and the pursuit of permanent superiority rather than partnership, and dominance rather than integration, represents another obstacle to building a region based on cooperation and mutual interests.

The new Middle East cannot be built on permanent revolution on one side, and permanent war on the other.

Nor can it be built on the logic of master and follower.

Rather, it requires strong, stable, and open states that compete economically, cooperate strategically, and place interests above ideology.

Therefore, the future of the region will not be determined solely by the fate of the Iranian regime, nor by the fate of current Israeli governments.

It will also depend on the strength of those currents, forces, and states that believe the future is built through development and integration, not through endless wars and conflicts.

If this vision succeeds, we may witness a new Middle East that is less turbulent and more prosperous.

But if the projects of permanent revolution and permanent war prevail, and if some Arab states remain prisoners of narrow calculations, consuming stability more than contributing to its creation, then the region may continue revolving within the same cycle, even if names and faces change.

But history is not shaped solely by those who obstruct.

If the major powers, rising states, and Arab countries capable of pursuing development and integration succeed in tipping the balance in favor of interests, economics, and lasting peace, then the new Middle East may be closer than many believe.

The region lacks neither money, nor location, nor resources.

What it lacks is the triumph of the will to build over the will to conflict.

And in the long run, history has shown that wars may delay the future, but they cannot defeat the will of nations and peoples that have decided to build it.

What Is the Endgame, and When?

The end is not near in the full sense of the word.

But the coming months will be decisive.

Within sixty days, the seriousness of the document will become clearer.

And within six months, it will become evident whether we are facing a viable agreement, or merely a long truce before another round.

For now, the most likely scenario is:

No full-scale war.

No complete peace.

But rather a prolonged testing phase, whose title is:

Negotiations above the table, and pressure beneath it.

Beautifying Danger

The greatest threat to peace is not war alone.

It is the beautification of danger.

Some crises do not truly end.

They simply change their names.

And some agreements do not address the causes.

They merely give everyone a temporary sense of reassurance.

The guns may fall silent.

But the ideas that ignited them remain.

The fronts may calm down.

But the instruments that created them remain in place.

That is why genuine peace is not built on hiding danger.

Nor on living with it.

Nor on beautifying it.

But on reducing it and changing the behavior that produces it.

The most dangerous thing that could happen to the region is not the failure of peace.

But the success of a peace that makes danger appear smaller than it really is.

Because a danger that is beautified…

may one day return at a far greater cost.

Peace does not begin merely when the sound of war fades, but when people stop beautifying the causes that produce it.

BETH Summary | B

What matters to Trump is an agreement that proves he ended the war without appearing weak.

What matters to Netanyahu is preventing Hezbollah and Iran from catching their breath, even if that comes at the expense of the American track.

What matters to Iran is preserving the regime and easing pressure without sacrificing its regional arms.

What matters to the Gulf states and the Arab world is de-escalation that does not reproduce the threat, and an agreement that does not leave the region hostage to proxies.

And what matters to the world is the stability of energy supplies, strategic routes, and preventing a wider war.

Therefore, the real question is not:

Will the negotiations succeed?

But rather:

Can negotiations change the behavior of players whose interests depend on the continuation of the crisis?

If behavior changes, a new Middle East may begin.

But if actors continue operating outside the script, the document will remain suspended between optimism and fire.

And the outcome will not be determined solely by what is said in Switzerland.

It will also be determined by what happens in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gulf.