Monitoring & Analysis | BETH | B

After ninety-four days of the U.S.–Israeli war with Iran, the region appears neither closer to a full-scale war nor closer to a lasting peace.

Negotiations remain unsettled.

American threats continue.

Iranian maneuvering has not stopped.

Meanwhile, the battlefield resembles a state of “suspended conflict,” where direct confrontations have diminished, while limited strikes and reciprocal signaling continue.

The most notable development today was the confirmation by U.S. officials that President Donald Trump privately told his aides he may reconsider the ceasefire if Iran were responsible for the deaths of American troops. At the same time, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stressed that the current exchanges are defensive in nature and do not represent a return to full-scale war.

On the political front, Trump once again hinted at the possibility of reaching an agreement with Iran within the coming days, despite Tehran's insistence that negotiations are currently suspended.

Meanwhile, leaked reports revealed details of a phased agreement proposal that would begin with de-escalation and ultimately address the nuclear file, with each phase linked to the fulfillment of commitments by both parties.

Yet the newest obstacle may not lie in Tehran this time.

It may lie in Washington itself.

Any agreement related to Iran’s nuclear program would be subject to the Iranian Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), which requires submission of the deal to Congress for review before implementation. This opens the door to a domestic political battle in the United States that could prove nearly as complicated as the negotiations with Iran themselves.

BETH Analysis

The closer the negotiations move toward an agreement, the more new obstacles seem to emerge.

And whenever threats escalate, diplomacy returns to the conversation.

As a result, the crisis appears trapped in a closed circle that has persisted for weeks.

The question many are asking today is:

Is the war moving toward a genuine conclusion?

Or is the region entering yet another chapter of a long game of strategic delay?

Current indicators suggest that Washington is not seeking to overthrow the Iranian state through direct military force. Rather, it aims to alter Iran’s nuclear and regional behavior at the lowest possible cost.

On the other hand, the Iranian regime does not appear to view any agreement as the end of the conflict. Instead, it seems to regard it as an opportunity to buy time, ease pressure, and reorganize its position.

Here lies the central knot:

Washington seeks to change Iranian behavior without bringing down the regime, while the regime seeks to preserve itself without abandoning the revolutionary doctrine that has formed the foundation of its power and legitimacy since 1979.

For this reason, the real challenge is not the signing of an agreement.

It is what happens after the agreement is signed.

The region does not suffer from a shortage of agreements.

It suffers from a shortage of confidence in their durability.

The Larger Question

After ninety-four days, the question is no longer:

Will an agreement be signed?

Rather:

Will the agreement produce a genuine change in the behavior of the Iranian regime?

If the agreement proves to be merely a temporary truce, the crisis may return in new forms within a few years.

But if it is accompanied by a real transformation in the philosophy governing the state and its regional relations, it could open the door to a more stable era.

Yet recent history gives many observers reason for caution.

Major crises do not always end when agreements are signed.

Sometimes a new phase begins immediately after the signatures are placed.

Reflection

Perhaps the most important question today is not:

Will America prevail?

Or:

Will Iran prevail?

But rather:

Will the idea of stability prevail over the management of perpetual conflict?

That is the question that may ultimately shape the future of the Middle East in the years ahead.

BETH (B Press) – All rights reserved