Does Tehran want to end the war, or does it want the time needed to prevent the regime's collapse?

By Abdullah Al-Omairah

Only hours after U.S. President Donald Trump announced that he would not attack Iran today, Tehran came forward to reaffirm that it remained open to negotiations and that messages with Washington were continuing through intermediaries.

This may appear to be a positive sign for those seeking an end to the war. However, an examination of the Iranian regime's behavior over the past decades, and its actions during recent months, suggests a different interpretation:

Iran is not necessarily seeking an agreement that ends the confrontation, but rather time that will help it survive.

When Tehran Speaks Gently

The Iranian regime has grown accustomed to changing its tone according to the level of danger it faces.

When it feels strong, it raises its demands and uses its military instruments and regional influence. When a strike approaches, diplomacy becomes active, messages multiply, and a willingness to negotiate emerges.

It is a policy resembling a snake: it coils up when it senses danger, but does not lose its ability to bite.

It is entirely possible that Iran's latest diplomatic openness is an attempt to buy time: to reorganize its remaining military capabilities, repair its command and communication networks, and move officials vulnerable to being targeted to safer locations.

Time here is not merely a political reprieve, but a valuable military resource.

Every day that passes without strikes may give Tehran an opportunity to reorganize its defenses, assess its losses, and prepare for another round.

The Problem Goes Beyond the Nuclear Issue

Since the establishment of the current Iranian regime in 1979, it has adopted a project extending beyond Iran's borders, based on exporting the revolution and expanding regional influence through support for armed militias and terrorist organizations linked to it in several countries across the region.

The nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and regional proxies have not been separate issues from this project, but rather different instruments for protecting the regime and expanding its ability to exert influence.

This is where the dilemma facing Washington lies.

A nuclear facility can be destroyed, a missile arsenal weakened, and the supply routes of an armed group cut off. But what is achieved if the leadership that created these instruments remains in place and continues to regard them as guarantees of its survival and the continuation of its project, based on exporting the revolution, interfering in the affairs of regional countries, and threatening regional and international security?

The instruments may change, but the project remains.

Therefore, an agreement that addresses weapons while ignoring the reasons behind their production and use may postpone the confrontation, but it leaves the danger in place.

What Comes After the Regime?

Here, a larger question arises, based on a scenario that I believe will materialize: What comes after the end of the current Iranian regime?

Will another regime emerge that reproduces its policies or revives the model of government that preceded it? Or will the transformations taking place in the region lead to a different system that redefines Iran's relationship with its neighbors and the world?

I believe that the end of this regime will open a historic opportunity for a new regional era, in which expansionist projects and proxy conflicts recede, to be replaced by relations based on respect for state sovereignty, economic integration, and shared interests among the countries of the region and the wider world.

The gains from peace, cooperation, and development will be far greater than any gains achieved through wars and struggles for influence.

A region exhausted by wars possesses the resources and human and economic capabilities needed to build a different future, if its priorities shift from competition for influence to cooperation and equitable economic integration in pursuit of development and stability.

One of the greatest enemies of stability is expansionist thinking that regards power as a means of imposing domination rather than protecting peace.

There is a fundamental difference between power used to safeguard security and stability, and power used to control others and threaten their sovereignty.

Power that protects peace builds a future, while power that seeks domination produces endless conflicts.

Perhaps the more important question is not who will govern Iran after the current regime, but what kind of Iran it will choose to become: a state that joins its neighbors in building peace, or an authority that reproduces the conflicts of the past?

What Did Netanyahu Understand?

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to have been among those who recognized the dimensions of this dilemma when he placed changing the Iranian regime among his political objectives, based on his conviction that the threat extends beyond the nuclear program and missiles to the nature of the regime itself and its regional policies.

From his perspective, disabling the nuclear program or weakening missile capabilities will not be sufficient if the leadership remains capable of rebuilding what it has lost.

This is the difference between targeting the instruments of power and targeting the source of decision-making.

But the issue is not that simple. Overthrowing the regime may be achievable through military force, but the more difficult challenge is: Who will come after it?

Will a system emerge that chooses stability and cooperation with regional countries, or will a new authority reproduce previous policies and become an instrument in the hands of other powers seeking to destabilize the region?

Moreover, the regime's collapse does not necessarily mean that its instruments will disappear. Armed networks may remain, centers of power may become fragmented, and Iran may enter a period of turmoil whose consequences are difficult to control.

New forces may also emerge seeking to exploit the remnants of militias and armed organizations and employ them in new conflicts.

Therefore, the question is not limited to how the regime might be overthrown, but extends to what will come afterward and how the consequences of its collapse can be contained.

This requires joint regional and international efforts to manage the transitional phase, prevent the emergence of a security vacuum, and dismantle or neutralize networks of violence, thereby preventing the reproduction of previous threats.

True success is not measured by the fall of the regime alone, but by the region's ability to overcome its legacy and build stability that does not reproduce the causes of conflict.

Trump Faces the Test

Trump has hinted more than once at the difficulty of knowing who holds decision-making authority in Tehran, particularly after strikes that targeted multiple levels of the Iranian leadership.

This is a problem that goes beyond the names of individuals.

A regime that seeks to conceal its leaders and protect its centers of decision-making may succeed in distributing authority and prolonging the confrontation, but it becomes less capable of making clear and enforceable commitments.

Trump may find himself facing a paradox: the greater the military pressure on Tehran, the stronger its desire to negotiate, but not necessarily its willingness to make concessions that would end the causes of the war.

Therefore, the test of any Iranian proposal lies not in the language of its statements, but in the specific commitments it contains, the cessation of activities that threaten security, and verification mechanisms that prevent an agreement from becoming a pause for rebuilding capabilities.

Expectations

I expect Tehran to continue demonstrating diplomatic openness while attempting to avoid an agreement that strips the regime of its essential instruments of power.

I also expect it to exploit any period of de-escalation to protect its leadership and restore its military capabilities wherever possible, particularly if it becomes convinced that the next American strike could extend beyond facilities to command centers.

Washington, meanwhile, may give negotiations one final opportunity, but it will face a question that is difficult to postpone: Does it want an agreement that temporarily stops the war, or a settlement that prevents its underlying causes from recurring?

The answer depends on how well American leaders understand the nature of the Iranian regime and the risks posed by its policies. Previous experiences have shown that some U.S. administrations dealt with Iran with a limited understanding of the nature of its regional project, or from the perspective of narrow interests and short-term gains, without sufficiently assessing the consequences for American and global security and the stability of the region.

I do not rule out the possibility that the United States will gradually move closer to the view that the problem extends beyond weapons to the very nature of the regime itself, although making a decision to change it remains a separate and more dangerous matter.

My most important expectation is that Iran will negotiate to buy time, while Washington will use that time to determine whether it will settle for weakening the regime or seek to change the equation governing its behavior.

In either case, merely announcing a willingness to negotiate will not constitute evidence of a change in Iranian policy.

A snake that coils up when threatened does not turn into a dove of peace overnight.