Washington prepares for a new round that may target Iranian energy facilities, while Tehran continues its attacks on Kuwait and prepares a response targeting vital infrastructure in Israel and American interests in the region

Monitoring and Analysis | Strategic Media Department – BETH Agency
Supervised by: Abdullah Al-Amirah

Riyadh | BETH

The U.S.-Iran war is heading toward a more dangerous round after U.S. President Donald Trump ordered the continuation of military operations against Iran, amid expectations that a new campaign could begin during the weekend and continue for several days, following the diplomatic track’s failure to achieve the results Washington seeks.

The decision came after Trump met with his national security team at Camp David on Friday evening to discuss developments in the war and the available military options, including expanding the list of targets to include energy facilities and infrastructure inside Iran.

Reports indicate that the United States and Israel are considering carrying out one of the harshest air campaigns against Iranian energy facilities, while Trump affirmed that the coming strikes would be “very harsh” unless Tehran changes its behavior.

Meanwhile, Iran has not limited itself to threatening a future response but has continued its attacks on Gulf states. Kuwait announced on Saturday morning that its air defenses had detected hostile drones inside its airspace, engaged them, and destroyed them.

The spokesperson for the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense said that the “Iranian aggression” targeted a government facility in the north of the country and civilian vehicles belonging to a company on Bubiyan Island, causing material damage without any human casualties.

The attack came two days after an Iranian strike targeted a building belonging to a Chinese company in northern Kuwait, killing one worker and causing severe material damage to the site, in an escalation that demonstrates the continued transfer of the war onto the territories of regional states and their civilian facilities.

Kuwait Under Attack

The repeated attacks on Kuwait give the current escalation a significance that goes beyond the exchange of strikes between Washington and Tehran.

Iran is not targeting only American forces or Israel. It is expanding the circle of pressure to include a Gulf state, government facilities, companies, and civilian vehicles, even though Kuwait is not a direct party to the war.

Following these attacks, it is difficult to regard Iranian statements rejecting escalation as an expression of a genuine desire for de-escalation.

The situation on the ground clearly indicates that Tehran is not moving toward ending the war at this stage. Instead, it continues to use attacks as a means of expanding its costs and threatening the security of surrounding states.

The repetition of the attacks within a few days also rules out the possibility that they were an isolated incident or an operational error and points to the continuation of the decision to attack, provoke, and pressure Gulf states.

Energy Enters the Battle

The danger of the coming American round lies in the possibility that it may shift from targeting military sites to striking Iranian energy facilities and infrastructure.

Targeting power plants, refineries, and oil and gas facilities would not only weaken military capabilities but would also strike the economy, public services, and people’s lives. It could push Iran to respond in kind against energy facilities, ports, and American bases in the region.

Tehran has announced that it has prepared a broad response plan that includes vital facilities inside Israel and energy infrastructure in the region, in an attempt to deter Washington from expanding the scope of its targets.

However, these threats place the region before an extremely dangerous equation:

If Washington strikes Iranian energy facilities, Tehran may respond by targeting energy facilities and ports in regional states, transforming the war from a military confrontation into a war against the arteries of the economy, energy, and trade.

The Paradox of Escalation

The commander of Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, the central operations command of the Iranian forces, accused the United States of moving rapidly toward escalating tensions in the Middle East.

However, the continuing Iranian attacks on Kuwait weaken this narrative. Tehran cannot accuse Washington of expanding the war while simultaneously attacking civilian and government facilities inside a Gulf state.

The Iranian strategy appears to be based on raising the regional cost of the war by sending a message that any escalation against Iran will not remain within its borders but will extend to Gulf states in the region, producing counterproductive results.

Every attack against a Gulf state gives Washington an additional justification for expanding its strikes and increases the need to build a more cohesive Gulf defense position. It also supports Saudi efforts to establish a multinational defensive maritime coalition to protect maritime corridors and vital facilities.

Situation Assessment

The region now stands on the threshold of a new stage that could be described as the period preceding a comprehensive infrastructure war.

The United States is preparing for a campaign lasting several days, Israel is preparing to participate in strikes against Iranian targets, while Tehran has announced that it has prepared a response targeting vital facilities.

The danger is therefore no longer limited to whether escalation will occur, but to its scale, limits, and the ability of the parties to stop it once it begins.

Developments reveal that the diplomatic track has not died completely, but it has become too weak to halt the military preparations. Meanwhile, trust between the two parties is declining to a level at which every round of negotiations becomes temporary cover for preparations for the next round.

Expectations

The most likely scenario is that the United States will carry out an intensive air campaign lasting several days, targeting military facilities, command centers, missile capabilities, and drones, along with a limited number of energy facilities of strategic value.

Iran is likely to respond with waves of missiles and drones against Israel and what it regards as American interests, while continuing to pressure Gulf states and navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

The most dangerous scenario would involve broad attacks against Iranian refineries, power plants, and oil facilities, followed by an Iranian response against energy facilities, ports, and infrastructure in the region.

This would lead to higher oil prices, shipping and insurance costs, disruption to part of maritime traffic, and the expansion of the war into states that do not wish to participate in it.

The possibility of postponing the strikes remains if an urgent diplomatic breakthrough is achieved, but it has become less likely following the continuing Iranian attacks and the issuance of the American order to continue military operations.

Conclusion

Iran’s repeated attacks on Gulf states reveal that Tehran is not merely preparing for war. It is already continuing it and working to expand its geographical scope.

The American preparations also reveal that Washington has shifted from attempting to contain Iran through limited strikes to considering targeting the sources of its economic power and its vital facilities.

The region is therefore moving between two opposing escalations:

An American escalation seeking to force Iran to retreat, and an Iranian escalation seeking to distribute the cost of the war across Gulf states and international interests.

However, the real danger lies not only in the next strike, but in the day that follows it:

Can the two parties stop the war after energy facilities, civilian infrastructure, and Gulf states enter the circle of targeting?

Or will the new round open a wider war that no one currently has a clear plan to end?

Why the Gulf States?

The recurring question remains:

Why does Iran attack Gulf states and Jordan under the pretext of targeting American interests, while avoiding directing the majority of its strikes against American forces stationed at sea and surrounding Iran, and against the American military bases from which the aircraft that actually strike Iran are launched?

The closest answer lies in calculating the cost.

American bases are fortified targets protected by advanced defense systems. Directly targeting them could inflict major American casualties and provoke a harsher military response whose limits Tehran would be unable to control.

Civilian and economic facilities in regional states, however, are less fortified and have a greater impact on markets and societies. They allow Iran to expand the cost of the war and pressure states hosting American forces without engaging in a direct and equal confrontation with American power.

However, this calculation reveals a clear moral and political contradiction:

If the United States is the adversary, why should Kuwait, Jordan, and the Gulf states pay the price?

Targeting these states does not merely constitute a strike against American interests. It is a direct attack on their sovereignty and an attempt to use their security, economies, and populations as instruments of pressure in a war they did not begin.

Iran therefore does not strike the state responsible for attacking it as much as it strikes the closest and least costly parties.

It does not choose the target most responsible for the war, but the target that is easiest to hurt.