Saudi defenses destroy new drones targeting oil facilities in the Eastern Region, while the Foreign Ministry affirms the Kingdom’s right to respond to the sources of aggression and deter the aggressors

Riyadh | BETH

Saudi air defenses intercepted and destroyed several drones that attempted to target oil facilities in the Eastern Region in a new attack launched from Iraqi territory and carried out by Iranian-backed terrorist militias.

The official spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense, Major General Turki Al-Maliki, said the terrorist attempts were once again launched from Iraq. He affirmed the Kingdom’s inherent right to defend itself and its national assets, as well as its right to respond at the time and place of its choosing.

The attack represents a continuation of attempts to target Saudi energy facilities using drones launched by Iranian-backed militias from inside Iraqi territory, following the interception of similar attacks by Saudi defenses during the past hours and days.

Foreign Ministry Condemns Continuing Attacks

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed the Kingdom’s condemnation in the strongest terms of the continued launching of drones by Iranian-backed militias in Iraq to target oil facilities in the Eastern Region.

The ministry affirmed the Kingdom’s determination to protect its security and sovereignty and its legal and legitimate right to take all necessary measures to respond to the sources of aggression and deter the aggressors.

It renewed its call for the Iraqi government to take all necessary measures to ensure that its territory is not used as a launchpad for aggression against the Kingdom.

The wording of the statement elevates the Saudi position from condemning and warning against the attacks to affirming the right to respond to the sources of aggression. This means the response may not necessarily be limited to intercepting drones after their launch, but could include the right to confront the parties and sites involved in preparing and directing them, in accordance with international law.

An Integrated Saudi Position

The Foreign Ministry’s statement followed successive affirmations by the Ministry of Defense and the Cabinet regarding attacks launched from Iraqi territory.

The Cabinet had condemned the attacks carried out by Iranian-backed terrorist militias in Yemen and Iraq against Saudi oil facilities and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, affirming that the Kingdom would not tolerate threats to its security, interests, and national assets.

It also stressed the need for the Iraqi government to take the necessary measures to prevent its territory from being used as a base for attacks against neighboring countries.

The Saudi position therefore consists of three interconnected levels:

A military interception that destroys the drones before they reach their targets.

Political action that holds the Iraqi government responsible for controlling its territory.

And legal affirmation of the Kingdom’s right to respond to the sources of aggression and deter the aggressors.

Iraq’s Responsibility

Referring to the attacks as having originated from Iraq does not mean accusing the Iraqi state of carrying them out, but it places its government before a direct sovereign responsibility.

The continued ability of armed militias to prepare and launch drones from Iraqi territory means that parties operating outside state institutions can make cross-border military decisions and expose Iraq to the consequences of operations that its government did not officially authorize.

As the attacks continue despite Saudi warnings, it is no longer sufficient to announce opposition to their use or to distance the state from them. The situation requires identifying launch sites, pursuing the perpetrators, disrupting financing and weapons networks, and preventing further attacks in a verifiable manner.

BETH Analysis | Asymmetric Provocation

The repeated launching of drones reveals an attempt by the militias to turn low-cost weapons into instruments of attrition and provocation against a state with an institutional military and advanced defensive capabilities.

The militia cannot engage in a balanced military confrontation with the Kingdom. It therefore sends individual drones or limited groups of them, hoping to achieve one of three effects:

Striking a sensitive facility.

Disrupting markets and increasing the cost of protection and insurance.

Or provoking the Kingdom into a hasty response that Iran and its militias could attempt to exploit politically.

The difference, however, is not limited to the scale of weaponry.

The militia launches its drones from outside the framework of the state and does not directly bear responsibility for the war it could ignite.

An institutional military, by contrast, operates under the authority of a state and determines the objective, timing, and scale of its response according to military, legal, and political calculations.

Saudi restraint therefore does not reflect an inability to respond. Rather, it prevents the militia from dictating the timing and form of that response. At the same time, affirming the right to target the sources of aggression means that continued attacks could shift the confrontation from destroying drones in the air to deterring the infrastructure that launches them from the ground.

An individual drone may have a limited military effect, but it carries a greater danger if the militia misreads Saudi patience.

A state that chooses the timing of its response does not relinquish that response. It simply refuses to grant the aggressor the right to choose the battle on its behalf.

Timing That Reveals Iran’s Method

The launching of the drones coincides with an international and regional tour by Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi that included Washington, Tehran, and Ankara, and precedes his scheduled visit to Saudi Arabia.

This timing gives the attacks a dimension extending beyond an attempt to strike an oil facility.

Al-Zaidi is attempting to present Iraq as a state reclaiming its decision-making authority, opening itself to multiple partnerships, and pledging to place all weapons under the control of official institutions. The militias, meanwhile, are using drones to demonstrate that decisions involving force and war beyond Iraq’s borders can still bypass the government.

The attacks serve a clear political function:

Weakening the prime minister’s position before his arrival in Riyadh, imposing the issue of uncontrolled weapons upon his discussions, and informing him that his tours and agreements do not grant him sole control over the movements of armed groups inside his country.

The timing also reveals Iran’s method of managing its relationships and crises.

Tehran received the Iraqi prime minister and signed agreements with his government. Its militias then continued to use Iraqi territory to target Saudi Arabia, placing its guest before a diplomatic and security crisis with the country he is preparing to visit.

This demonstrates that Iranian decision-making does not emanate from a single political center. Rather, it is contested by institutions and factions led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Consequently, an agreement with the government is insufficient to guarantee the compliance of other centers of power, placing the credibility of Iranian commitments under constant scrutiny.

This means that Iran deals with the Iraqi state and the militia network through two parallel tracks:

It signs agreements with the government and publicly affirms its respect for Iraqi sovereignty.

At the same time, it retains armed forces capable of operating outside state institutions and of pressuring, embarrassing, and obstructing the government’s choices whenever necessary.

This method does not require Tehran to issue detailed instructions for every drone.

Iran has built, financed, armed, and trained an armed network and tied its survival to its regional project. These groups have consequently come to understand the direction that serves Tehran’s objectives and operate within it, whether orders are issued for every individual operation or the course has been established in advance.

Here, the function of denying ties to the militias becomes clear.

Tehran is not attempting to convince governments and intelligence agencies that it has no knowledge of these groups, because their political, military, and financial connections have become exposed.

It uses denial to disperse responsibility, complicate the identification of the party against which a response should be directed, and raise the legal and political cost of confrontation, while retaining the results of an attack if it succeeds and disavowing its consequences if it fails.

Through this formula, Iran achieves three benefits:

Applying pressure without openly declaring a direct war.

Embarrassing the Iraqi government and weakening its ability to make independent decisions.

And testing the Kingdom’s response through a proxy for which it attempts to deny responsibility.

Iraq’s expanding relations with the United States, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the development of new energy and investment routes, also reduce Baghdad’s dependence on Tehran.

Iranian-backed forces therefore seek to obstruct this course and keep Iraq within a security environment in which the influence of weapons is stronger than that of the government and its agreements.

The militias targeted Saudi Arabia, embarrassed the Iraqi prime minister following his visit to Tehran, and demonstrated that an agreement with Iran does not necessarily mean the suspension of its armed instruments.

Indeed, embarrassing Al-Zaidi may itself be part of the message:

The head of government may sign agreements and visit foreign capitals, but Tehran wants the power to disrupt Iraq’s relations and activate its fronts to remain in the hands of the network it has built inside the country.

Iranian maneuvering therefore does not appear to be a naïve attempt to convince the world that it has no knowledge of the militias.

It is a method of exercising power from behind a transparent curtain:

The state signs the agreement, the militia applies the pressure, and Tehran leaves others to bear the burden of dealing with the consequences.

The Iranian regime, represented by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, manages what remains of its influence through a formula that has become exposed: the political use of the concept of taqiyya by outwardly displaying the opposite of what it conceals; procrastination to gain time; changing positions as circumstances shift; using guerrilla methods to carry out scattered attacks and subsequently deny responsibility; and mobilizing what remains of its dispersed power through proxies.

But this formula loses its effectiveness once its components are exposed. Denial no longer conceals responsibility, and maneuvering no longer prevents others from identifying the source, direction, and objective of the decision.

Is the End Drawing Near?

The scattered attacks indicate that the survival of the Iranian regime and its regional project is now at stake. When the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps shifts from expanding its influence to mobilizing what remains of its dispersed power in limited operations that inflict greater costs than gains, this reveals diminishing options and a failure to assess the consequences.

The regime has entered a stage in which it is no longer fighting to export the revolution as much as it is fighting to prevent its collapse. Yet the instruments it built to protect itself are now draining it, while the militias that once expanded its influence have become evidence exposing its responsibility and multiplying its adversaries. If this course continues, the project will not end as the result of a single strike, but through the cumulative effect of short-sighted decisions that consume what remains of its power until it can no longer protect the home front through the danger it exports abroad.

Monitoring and Analysis | Strategic Media Department – BETH Agency
Supervised by: Abdullah Al-Omairah