Special Report | BETH

Iran shifts pressure from Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab, while the Houthis open a front that threatens to place the region’s exports between two embattled waterways

The Houthi targeting of two Saudi vessels in the Red Sea does not appear to be an isolated incident separate from the war surrounding Iran and the Strait of Hormuz.

To the east, Tehran faces a U.S. blockade of its ports and continuing strikes that are degrading its military and naval capabilities.

To the west, the Houthis have moved against Saudi vessels, threatening to ignite Bab al-Mandab and turn the Red Sea into a new pressure front.

When the two fronts are placed within a single picture, a development more dangerous than the attacks themselves emerges:

Iran is attempting to expand the war from one strait to two, compensating for its military weakness at home by applying pressure to the region’s trade and energy arteries.

This original BETH assessment is based on official statements and declared movements, alongside an analysis of the relationship between the confrontation in Hormuz and the Houthi escalation in the Red Sea.

The East Closes In on Iran

U.S. Central Command announced the resumption of the naval blockade against vessels entering or leaving Iranian ports, confirming that it would enforce the blockade against maritime traffic connected to Iranian ports and coastal areas while allowing non-violating vessels to continue sailing.

The blockade is not limited to surveillance.

U.S. forces have intercepted vessels, redirected others, disabled ships that failed to comply with warnings, and deployed Marines to board and search some of them.

Iran therefore faces two forms of pressure in the east:

• Strikes that degrade its military infrastructure.
• A blockade that restricts its ability to export, import, and rebuild what has been destroyed.

As Tehran’s ability to protect its ports and maintain full control around Hormuz declines, it needs to transfer part of the war’s cost to an area not directly controlled by Iranian forces.

This is where Bab al-Mandab enters the picture.

The West Ignites

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that the Houthis had attacked two Saudi vessels. He said they had been drawn into the confrontation by Iran and called on them to de-escalate and remain outside the war.

The attacks were preceded by Houthi threats against Saudi vessels, interests, and shipping through Bab al-Mandab. Regional countries warned the United Nations Security Council that these threats represented an escalation affecting the Kingdom’s security and the stability of international navigation.

The visible development is the Houthis’ entry into the confrontation.

The deeper meaning is that Iranian pressure is no longer confined to the Arabian Gulf.

Through the Houthis, Iran can threaten the western maritime passage without moving its own ships or missiles into the Red Sea and without immediately assuming direct military responsibility for opening the new front.

It is using a geographically distant proxy to extend the war into an area its conventional forces cannot directly reach.

A Maritime Pincer

The Strait of Hormuz lies east of the Arabian Peninsula and serves as the principal maritime gateway for energy exports from the Gulf.

Bab al-Mandab lies to the west, connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, and forming part of the maritime route to the Suez Canal and European markets.

Simultaneous threats to both waterways would not mean a complete halt to Saudi and Gulf exports. The Kingdom possesses pipelines, ports, and alternative routes that provide it with significant room for maneuver.

The danger lies in reducing those alternatives and increasing their cost.

When Hormuz becomes unstable, attention shifts toward Red Sea ports.

If Bab al-Mandab is also threatened, shipping from the Red Sea toward the Indian Ocean—particularly to Asian markets—becomes more costly and dangerous.

Geography then becomes a pincer:

• Reciprocal Iranian and American pressure at Hormuz.
• Houthi escalation at Bab al-Mandab.
• Saudi and Gulf energy and trade routes stretching between them.

The objective is not necessarily to close both straits completely.

Making passage through them costly and unreliable may be enough.

Why Now?

The timing is not accidental.

Iran is facing continuing U.S. strikes, a blockade of its ports, and declining defensive and naval capabilities, while Washington’s potential target list continues to expand.

Under these conditions, Tehran needs to achieve four objectives:

• Divert U.S. forces and attention away from Hormuz.
• Raise the cost of the war for Saudi Arabia and other regional countries.
• Threaten an alternative route for energy exports.
• Demonstrate that Iran’s attrition will not remain confined within its borders.

Opening a Red Sea front forces the United States and its partners to distribute their capabilities across two maritime theaters instead of concentrating them around Iran and the Gulf.

It also gives Tehran an indirect pressure card that it can use in negotiations:

If the Red Sea is to become calm, developments affecting Iran must be taken into account.

International navigation therefore becomes part of the political bargaining process.

The Houthis Are Not Iran’s Navy

The connection between the two fronts does not mean that the Houthis always act under direct operational orders from Tehran or that every decision they make is drafted inside an Iranian command room.

The Houthis have their own local calculations and political and military interests. They may use the regional conflict to strengthen their position inside Yemen and in future negotiations.

Over the years, however, Iran has built an arms, training, political support, and technical relationship that has enabled the Houthis to threaten maritime traffic from a distance.

Tehran does not need to direct every missile to benefit from its effects.

It is enough that Iran helped build the force capable of launching it and that the attack intersects with Tehran’s strategic need to expand the war.

This reveals the difference between a direct order and a strategic function:

The Houthis may not be an Iranian military unit, but they are performing a function that Iran needs today.

Why Saudi Arabia?

Targeting Saudi vessels carries more than one message.

Saudi Arabia is a major energy producer and exporter. It has coastlines on both the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea, as well as infrastructure that allows it to bypass some of the disruption in Hormuz.

Pressure in the Red Sea therefore targets one of the Kingdom’s most important sources of strategic flexibility.

Saudi Arabia is also the region’s political and economic center of gravity. Any escalation against it generates international attention more rapidly than an attack on a passing vessel unconnected to a pivotal state.

The attacks, however, also place the Houthis in a highly dangerous position.

During recent years, the Kingdom has maintained a path of de-escalation across the region and in Yemen while supporting political and humanitarian efforts.

Targeting its vessels could change the nature of its calculations.

Threatening Saudi navigation does not merely pressure a political actor. It threatens the economy, energy, sovereignty, and trade routes.

No state can treat such issues as a local bargaining card.

Are the Houthis Trying to Draw Saudi Arabia into War?

One potential objective of the attacks is to draw the Kingdom into a direct military confrontation that would reopen the war in Yemen.

Saudi Arabia’s entry into a broad conflict could deliver several gains to the Houthis and Iran:

• Relieve part of the U.S. military pressure on Iran.
• Open a new front that disperses forces and international attention.
• Give the Houthis a pretext for domestic mobilization and allow them to portray themselves as confronting a foreign power.
• Disrupt the political process and postpone peace obligations inside Yemen.
• Transform the Houthis from an actor responsible for governing Yemeni areas into a movement mobilizing its supporters under the banner of war.

Tehran may be calculating that repeated provocations will push the Kingdom into a rapid response, which could then be used to expand the confrontation and connect the Yemeni front to the Iranian war.

This calculation, however, overlooks the nature of Saudi decision-making.

The Kingdom does not treat developments as isolated triggers for reaction. It assesses their timing, objectives, and beneficiaries, while balancing the protection of its security against preventing adversaries from imposing their preferred battlefield.

Saudi restraint therefore does not indicate an absence of capability, just as the pursuit of peace does not mean accepting aggression.

Saudi Arabia can protect its interests and strengthen deterrence without being drawn into a war whose timing and location were selected by its adversary.

If it is compelled to act, the Kingdom possesses the military, political, and economic capabilities—and the alliances—to respond with wisdom, strength, and resolve beyond what its adversary may expect.

Saudi Arabia does not need to prove its capabilities through impulsive action.

Its power is demonstrated by choosing the timing, identifying the objective, calibrating the scale of its response, and denying the adversary the gain it sought through provocation.

What Does Iran Want?

Iran does not appear capable of winning a direct naval confrontation with the United States.

Nor can it protect all its facilities, ports, and capabilities from continuing attrition.

It can, however, try to prevent its adversaries from achieving victory at a low cost.

Its strategy is therefore designed to transform American power from an advantage into a burden.

As the fronts expand:

• Washington requires more ships, bases, and interception operations.
• The cost of protecting navigation rises.
• The possibility of a civilian or military target being struck increases.
• Trade and energy prices suffer.
• International pressure to end the war intensifies.

Iran does not need to control the two straits.

It needs to keep the threat surrounding them alive.

The threat alone raises insurance costs, changes shipping routes, pressures markets, and makes the wider world a participant in the search for a settlement.

Can the Pincer Succeed?

Iran and the Houthis possess the ability to disrupt maritime traffic, but transforming that capability into a sustained blockade is more difficult.

The United States has deployed significant naval forces near Hormuz and the Arabian Sea and has demonstrated its readiness to intercept and board vessels and use force to enforce its blockade.

International and regional forces are also operating in the Red Sea, including the European Union’s Operation ASPIDES, whose defensive mandate includes protecting vessels and freedom of navigation.

Saudi Arabia possesses naval and air capabilities, multiple ports, and energy transportation infrastructure that reduces its dependence on a single maritime passage.

The Iranian strategy may therefore succeed in raising costs and disrupting traffic, but it will struggle to close both straits completely for an extended period.

It could even produce the opposite result:

An expanded maritime coalition against Iran and the Houthis, further justification for the United States to strike additional capabilities, and a Saudi reassessment of its restraint in Yemen.

The danger for Tehran is that an attempt to reduce pressure on itself could create a new front that deepens its isolation.

The Saudi Test

The Kingdom faces a delicate equation.

It must protect its vessels and ports and demonstrate that threats will not impose new rules on its trade.

At the same time, it will not easily grant the Houthis and Iran the broad war into which they may be attempting to draw it.

Saudi Arabia’s response could therefore develop through several calibrated levels:

• Strengthening maritime and air protection.
• Increasing coordination with international forces.
• Applying political pressure on the Houthis and their supporters.
• Keeping the door to de-escalation open under clear conditions.
• Conducting measured responses against sources of threat if attacks continue.
• Retaining broader options if the Kingdom’s security, infrastructure, or navigation faces a direct threat.

Resolve does not mean rushing into war.

It means preventing the Houthis from believing that Saudi commitment to peace amounts to accepting threats against navigation, while preventing Iran from turning the Kingdom into a party to a battle designed primarily to relieve pressure on Tehran.

Foresight

The War of Two Straits could develop along three paths:

Containing the Western Front

Mediation succeeds in halting Houthi attacks, while the conflict remains concentrated around Iran and Hormuz.

This would be the best path for the Houthis if they want to protect their political gains inside Yemen and avoid drawing a more powerful force into direct confrontation.

Threat Without Closure

Limited and intermittent attacks continue to keep insurance markets and shipping under pressure without attempting to close Bab al-Mandab completely or provoking a broad Saudi response.

This is the most advantageous path for Iran because it creates disruption with minimal direct responsibility.

The Red Sea Becomes a War Front

Attacks continue, or vessels and critical infrastructure are struck, prompting Saudi Arabia, the United States, and international forces to conduct wider operations against Houthi capabilities.

Tehran would then lose the advantage of indirect warfare because its proxy would become a direct target—and could face a response greater than Iran anticipated when it opened the front.

Conclusion

Developments in Bab al-Mandab cannot be separated from those in Hormuz.

In the east, the United States is blockading Iran and striking its capabilities.

In the west, the Houthis are attempting to transfer pressure to the Red Sea.

Between the two passages move energy, trade, and international interests.

Iran cannot break the U.S. blockade through a direct naval confrontation. It is therefore attempting to widen the area of cost, threaten the alternative route, and force its adversaries to defend two fronts.

Through the Houthis, it may also seek to draw Saudi Arabia into a war that would disperse pressure on Tehran and reshuffle the political and military landscape in Yemen and the wider region.

Saudi Arabia, however, understands that strength is not always found in the response an adversary expects.

It may instead lie in protecting interests, strengthening deterrence, choosing the timing, and denying the enemy the power to determine the shape of the confrontation—while retaining the ability to respond with a level of resolve that exceeds its calculations when circumstances require it.