Eight Nights of Airstrikes.. Iran Targets Kuwait and Bahrain Again, While Israel Awaits Tehran’s Decision

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The United States completed its eighth consecutive night of airstrikes inside Iran, targeting sites and forces affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard that it said had participated in the attack that killed two U.S. service members, left a third missing, and injured four others in Jordan on July 17.

The U.S. Central Command said the strikes were carried out on the orders of President Donald Trump to punish those responsible for the attack, while continuing to degrade the Iranian capabilities used to threaten U.S. forces and navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

The U.S. campaign has thus shifted from targeting Iran’s military and naval capabilities to conducting strikes with an explicitly declared punitive objective, following the first U.S. fatalities in the latest confrontation.

In response, the Iranian Armed Forces announced that they had carried out extensive attacks using one-way attack drones against two bases hosting U.S. forces in Kuwait.

Tehran said the attacks targeted a U.S. Army ammunition depot at Al-Adairah Base, as well as a Patriot radar system and an air-surveillance radar at Ali Al Salem Air Base.

Neither the United States nor Kuwait has confirmed that the targets announced by Iran were hit, while the Kuwaiti military said its air defenses had confronted Iranian missile and drone threats.

The latest attacks followed strikes on Kuwait on Friday and Saturday that hit two power stations and a site in the oil sector, according to Kuwaiti authorities, amid Gulf condemnation of attacks on civilian facilities and their description as war crimes.

In Israel, security assessments revealed a heightened state of alert over the possibility of the country being targeted by Iranian missiles and drones, or through the mobilization of Tehran-linked groups in the region.

Israeli reports said Tel Aviv had offered to join the U.S. military operations inside Iran, but the Trump administration rejected its participation at the current stage in an attempt to keep the confrontation confined to the United States and Iran. Earlier reports had indicated that Washington did not want Israel involved in the latest strikes.

However, an Israeli official confirmed that his country’s position could change if Iran targeted Israeli territory, making Tehran’s decision the factor that could move Israel from a state of alert to direct participation.

Analysis

From Attrition to Revenge

The eighth night represents a shift in American political and military language.

During the previous nights, Washington focused on degrading Iran’s surveillance, supply, weapons-storage, and naval capabilities. The latest strikes, however, carried an additional and explicitly declared objective: punishing the forces responsible for killing U.S. service members.

This shift is significant because American fatalities raise the cost of retreat for the administration and transform the war from an operation intended to achieve strategic objectives into an issue connected to deterrence, prestige, and military revenge.

Washington may find itself compelled to continue the strikes until it can present an outcome to the American public that can be described as clear and proportionate punishment, even if its original objectives were less extensive.

In contrast, Iran’s success in directly inflicting U.S. casualties may encourage the hardline faction in Tehran to believe that expanding the attacks increases the cost of the war for Washington.

However, the deaths of the service members could produce the opposite result, giving the United States a political justification to expand its target list and increase the level of force used.

Why Kuwait and Bahrain Again?

The renewed Iranian attacks today on Kuwait and Bahrain reveal that Tehran views the U.S. military presence in the Gulf as a single network, rather than as bases separate from the countries hosting them.

Iran attempts in its rhetoric to distinguish between targeting the U.S. presence and targeting Kuwait and Bahrain, but the nature of the weapons used eliminates this distinction in practice.

A missile or drone heading toward a base inside a sovereign state does not enter a military zone isolated from its surroundings; it crosses the country’s airspace and threatens its population, facilities, and services.

When power stations or oil facilities are struck, Kuwait and Bahrain become two parties harmed by a war in whose launching they had no part.

Here, Iran is committing a recurring strategic error: it attempts to pressure the United States through its allies, but instead pushes those allies toward greater military and political coordination with Washington.

Kuwait Becomes an Arena

Kuwait holds particular importance in U.S. calculations. It is a logistical location because of its geographical proximity to Iran and Iraq, and it hosts bases and facilities that support supply, surveillance, and air defense.

By targeting it, Tehran seeks to disrupt part of the infrastructure supporting U.S. operations.

However, the repeated attacks on Kuwait are gradually transforming it from a country hosting a U.S. military presence into an arena receiving direct strikes.

As the damage extends to electricity, water, and oil facilities, defending Kuwait becomes part of defending collective Gulf security, and responding to the attacks is no longer a bilateral matter between Kuwait and Iran.

Did Iran Hit Its Targets?

Tehran announced that it had targeted an ammunition depot and radar systems at Al-Adairah and Ali Al Salem bases, but it has not yet provided independent evidence proving that these targets were hit.

Kuwait, meanwhile, announced that its air defenses had confronted missiles and drones, without providing a detailed account of what was intercepted or what penetrated the defenses.

This opens a new round in the battle of narratives:

Iran needs to demonstrate its ability to penetrate the defenses and strike the U.S. presence.

Kuwait needs to affirm its defense systems’ ability to protect its territory.

The United States needs to prove that its regional deployment has not become an exposed point of weakness.

The decisive measure, however, will not be the number of drones launched, but whether Iran succeeded in disabling a base, radar system, or military stockpile, which has not yet been confirmed.

Israel at the Door

Washington’s rejection of Israeli participation does not indicate a disagreement over Iran, but rather a difference over the management of the war.

The United States wants to remain the decision-maker regarding the scale, timing, and limits of the strikes. It recognizes that Israel’s entry would give Tehran a justification to expand the confrontation and could open the fronts of Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.

Israeli participation could also embarrass regional countries harmed by the Iranian attacks but unwilling to appear as part of a war led by Israel.

Washington therefore appears keen to benefit from Israel’s logistical infrastructure and military preparations without allowing Tel Aviv, so far, to move into the attack.

Israel, meanwhile, has linked its intervention to Iran’s response. This means that the first Iranian missile to hit it may not merely add a new target to the war, but an entire army.

Behind the Developments

Following the deaths of two U.S. service members, Iran is no longer merely striking around U.S. forces; it has succeeded in directly inflicting casualties on them in Jordan.

However, this tactical success places Tehran before a greater strategic danger, because Washington now has an additional reason to continue and expand its campaign.

At the same time, Iran continues to direct a significant part of its response toward Gulf states and Jordan, while U.S. strikes continue inside its territory.

This geographical imbalance forces the region’s countries to pay the price of a war centered between Washington and Tehran, and increases the possibility of a firmer Gulf position emerging against Iran.

Israel, meanwhile, stands at the dividing line between preparation and participation. Washington has so far succeeded in keeping it out of the strikes, but that decision is no longer in the hands of the United States alone; Tehran can change it with a single strike.

Conclusion

On Day 137 since the beginning of the war, the confrontation has entered a more dangerous stage.

The United States is no longer striking solely to degrade Iranian capabilities, but also to punish those who killed its service members.

Iran is no longer content with threatening U.S. bases, but is repeating its attacks inside Kuwait, where military targets overlap with the country’s security and civilian facilities.

Israel has not entered the war, but it has completed its preparations to do so if Tehran gives it the reason.

After eight nights of airstrikes, following a period of unsuccessful negotiations and maneuvering, the question is no longer who can continue striking, but who can prevent the next strike from turning mutual revenge into a regional war whose boundaries no party can control.